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Sex Offenses Under Military Law:
Will the Recent Changes in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice Re-traumatize Sexual Assault
Survivors in the Courtroom?
Lisa M. Schenck
President Barack Obama said Tuesday that he has “no tolerance” for
sexual assault in the military, comments made in the wake of a new
Pentagon report showing the instances of such crimes have spiked since
2010 . . . . “I expect consequences,” Obama added. “So I don’t just
want more speeches or awareness programs or training, but ultimately
folks look the other way. If we find out somebody’s engaging in this,
they’ve got to be held accountable—prosecuted, stripped of their
positions, court[-]martialed, fired, dishonorably discharged. Period.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Commander-in-Chief, President Barack Obama, as quoted above,
recently turned his attention to sexual assault in the military services. The
President is not alone in his concern. Congress, the media, and the American
public have focused similar attention on this hot topic over the past twenty years.
Congress and the media have criticized, analyzed, and pushed the Department of
Defense [DoD],2 to review and revamp its sexual assault prevention, training, and


Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professorial Lecturer in Law, Senior Adviser to the
National Security Law LL.M. Program, The George Washington University Law School. The author
is a retired U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps colonel who served as an Associate and
Senior Judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals (2002–08); upon retirement, she served as
the Senior Adviser to the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services (2008-09).
B.A., Providence College; M.P.A., Fairleigh Dickinson University; J.D., Notre Dame Law School;
LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School; LL.M., Yale Law School; J.S.D.,
Yale Law School. This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the
views of the University, Law School, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army. The
author would like to thank Julie Dickerson and Michelle Ross, two dedicated research assistants, for
their assistance and support. Copyright © 2014 by Lisa M. Schenck.
1
Michael O’Brien, Obama: ‘No Tolerance’ for Military Sexual Assault, NBC NEWS (May 7,
2013),
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/07/18107743-obama-no-tolerance-formilitary-sexual-assault?lite.
2
In this article, the terms “military,” “military services,” and “Armed Forces” will be used
interchangeably. Although Congress emphasizes the importance of the DoD’s sexual assault
prevention and response policies, the DoD is a civilian organization that oversees the military
services. The DoD
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response programs, as well as its accountability, methods of reporting,
investigating, and disposing of sexual assault cases. Part of the Congressional
“push” included requesting that the DoD propose revisions to the existing punitive
articles addressing sexual assault in the Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ].
Congress passed sweeping legislative changes to military law effective in 2007 and
made modest changes effective in 2012. As a result, the military services have
been trying sexual assault cases using a completely revised punitive article,
grouping sexual assault offenses under Article 120 of the UCMJ.
Although described as being more protective of victims and covering the vast
array of sexual assault offenses, this Article argues that the recent changes in
substantive military law regarding sexual assault in 2007 and 2012 are not
sufficient to fully protect victims and may not result in the convictions that the
President, Congress, the media, and the public are so anxious to see in military
sexual assault cases. While perpetrators may be tried by courts-martial, they may
not be “stripped of their positions, court[-]martialed, fired, [or] dishonorably
discharged”3 as President Obama hopes; rather, they may be acquitted.
This Article evaluates substantive military criminal law, UCMJ art. 120
[Article 120], and Military Rules of Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 404(a) and 405(c).
Drawing on lessons learned from state and federal4 laws, the Article then makes
recommendations regarding statutory changes in military criminal sexual assault
and procedural statutes.
Specifically, the author recommends amending
substantive military criminal law to add the offense of “Indecent Act” back into
Article 120; modifying the definition of force; eliminating the increased emphasis
on whether the victim’s fears are “reasonable”; removing the focus from the
accused’s perceptions of the victim; returning the statutory limitations on the
affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent; adopting California’s
evidentiary threshold for giving affirmative defense instructions on mistake of fact
as to consent and consent; and creating a statutory structure to restrict judicial
appellate discretion in determining the need for some lesser-included offense
instructions.
is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of
the United States (U.S.). The major elements of these forces are the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps. The President is the Commander-in-Chief, while the Secretary of Defense
exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department. This includes the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the three
Military Departments, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General,
seventeen Defense Agencies, ten DoD Field Activities, and other organizations, such as the
National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO).
Organizations and Functions of the Department of Defense, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., OFFICE
OF
THE
DIR.
OF
ADMIN.
AND
MGMT.
http://odam.defense.gov/omp/Functions/Organizational_Portfolios/Organization_and_Functions_Gui
debook.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).
3
O’Brien, supra note 1.
4
As used in this article, the term “federal” does not include the military or Armed Forces.
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The author also notes that some military justice system critics attribute
unwarranted acquittals in sexual assault cases to the courts-martial practice of
allowing evidence of the accused’s good military character. Admitting such
evidence regarding the accused’s good military character may shift the trial focus
from the misconduct at issue to the accused’s stellar military service record. In
many cases, the chain of command may testify on the accused’s behalf, and a
process known as “reverse command influence,” a type of jury nullification, may
result in the accused’s acquittal, even in cases where evidence of the accused’s
guilt is overwhelming. The author supports a statute-based amendment of Mil. R.
Evid. 404(a) and 405(c) to clarify that general military character or good soldier
evidence is not admissible to show probability of innocence for sexual assault
offenses.5
II. BACKGROUND: WHY THE CRY FOR CHANGE?
Substantive military criminal law is set forth in the UCMJ punitive articles.6
Since Congress passed the UCMJ in 1950, two enumerated articles covered the
5

Another approach to restrict good military character evidence is illustrated by Senate Bill
1917, the Victims Protection Act which passed in the 113th Congress 2d. Session, on Mar. 6, 2014 by
a vote of 97-0. Section 3(g) provides:
(g) MODIFICATION OF MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
GENERAL MILITARY CHARACTER TOWARD PROBABILITY OF INNOCENCE.—Not later than
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, Rule 404(a) of the Military Rules of
Evidence shall be modified to clarify that the general military character of an accused is
not admissible for the purpose of showing the probability of innocence of the accused,
except that evidence of a trait of the military character of an accused may be offered in
evidence by the accused when that trait is relevant to an element of an offense for which
the accused has been charged.
The difficulty with this approach is if the President defines the term “good military character”
too broadly, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in all likelihood will overturn some sexual
assault convictions as well as other convictions because that court gives limited deference to the
President’s interpretations of statutes. See infra note 30. The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
has long held that good military character is relevant for all offenses. If the President defines “good
military character” too narrowly, then the rights of victims will be unfairly harmed. See infra notes
136–54 and accompanying text.
6
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 877–934 (2006). The UCMJ punitive articles are listed in Appendix 2 of
the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MCM]. The President,
through executive orders providing elements and some definitions for offenses, and various service
regulations are important sources of substantive military criminal law. See 2012 MCM (2011); U.S.
DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27–10 (2011) [hereinafter AR 27–10]. On June 30, 1775, the Second
Continental Congress established sixty-nine Articles of War to govern the conduct of the Continental
Army. William Winthrop, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 21 (1920). Upon the ratification of the
United States Constitution in 1789, Article I, Section 8 endowed Congress with the power to regulate
the land and naval forces. Using its newly endowed powers, on April 10, 1806, Congress enacted
101 Articles of War, superseding the Revolutionary War articles, under which the Army operated for
decades. Id. at 23. Discipline in the Navy was governed by the Articles for the Government of the
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most serious sexual assault offenses, “Rape and Carnal Knowledge” (Article 120),
and “Sodomy” (Article 125), and the general article covered a broad category of
sex offenses under the categories of “Indecent Assault,” “Indecent Acts or
Liberties with a Child,” “Indecent Exposure,” and “Indecent Acts with Another”
(Article 134).
Prior to the statutory changes implemented in the past ten years, the offense of
rape under Article 120 reflected the common law and was defined as, “[a]ny
person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force
and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other
punishment as a court-martial may direct.”7 This definition of rape became widely
criticized as antiquated; because “force” lacks “obvious or plain” meaning, the
statutory scheme focused attention on the victim’s conduct as opposed to the
accused’s conduct, and culpability-based gradations of conduct and punishment are
more effective in deterring crime.8 “The requirement that a woman resist her
assailant grew out of the law’s suspicion of the credibility of unchaste or vengeful
women.”9 As views of women’s place in society changed, however, the law
eventually followed.10
In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] identified the
problems associated with Article 120’s dated rape definition:
United States Navy. DEP’T OF THE NAVY—NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, available at
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-7.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). Congress passed the
UCMJ on May 5, 1950, which placed the military and naval services under the same disciplinary
statutes, and President Harry S. Truman signed it into law. On May 31, 1951, the UCMJ went into
effect. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, http://www.ucmj.us/history-of-the-ucm (last visited
May 17, 2014).
7

The 1950 version of UCMJ, art. 120, 10 U.S.C. 920, was enacted on May 5, 1950, (May 5,
1950, ch. 169, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 140) and remained in effect without substantial changes until the
statute was amended on January 6, 2006 by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §§ 551–53, 119 Stat. 3136, 3256–64 (2006) (codified as amended at 10
U.S.C. § 920 (2006)). The January 6, 2006 amendment became effective on October 1, 2007. See
P.L. 109-163, Div A, Title V, Subtitle E, § 552(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3257, as provided by § 552(f) of such
Act. The version of Article 120 in effect prior to October 1, 2007 will be referred to hereinafter as
“2006 Article 120” and the version effective on October 1, 2007 will be referred to hereinafter as
“2007 Article 120.”
8

Major Timothy W. Murphy, USAF, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39
A.F.L. REV. 19, 19–23 (1996). A brief description of courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses such as
rape, and the changing jurisprudence of rape prosecutions in the military over the last hundred years
is provided in Mark Harvey, SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ: A REPORT FOR THE JOINT SERVICE
COMMITTEE
ON
MILITARY
JUSTICE
(Feb.
2005),
available
at
www.dod.mil/dodgc/php/docssubcommittee_reportmarkharvey1-13-05.doc [hereinafter 2005 SEX
CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC]; see also DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, Comparison of
Title 18 Sexual Offenses and UCMJ Sexual Offenses (May 2005).
9
Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the
Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 567, 569 (1983) (internal citations omitted).
10

Id. at 570.
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[Article 120 did] not reflect the more recent trend for rape statutes to
recognize gradations in the offense based on context. These statutes
incorporate the legal realization that the force used may vary depending
on the relationship and familiarity, if any, between perpetrator and
victim, but the essence of the offense remains the same—sexual
intercourse against the will of the victim. Because Article 120 is dated,
its elements may not easily fit the range of circumstances now generally
recognized as “rape,” including date rape, acquaintance rape, statutory
rape, as well as stranger-on-stranger rape. As a result, the traditional
military rape elements have been applied in contexts for which the
elements were not initially contemplated. Case law has evolved to
address this reality.11
III. WILL THE REVISED ARTICLE 120 RESULT IN MORE SEXUAL ASSAULT
CONVICTIONS?: STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE
UCMJ
Without recommending specific statutory changes, DoD reports published
over the past decade have included some review12 of the sex offenses available
under military law for which military offenders may be tried for sexual assaults.13
Congress, in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2005, required the Secretary of Defense to propose changes to the existing
sex offenses in the UCMJ, “to conform . . . more closely to other [f]ederal laws and
regulations that address [sexual assault],”14 but existing federal statutes15 were
11
United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (citing
United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (drill instructor’s coercive influence
over recruits); United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7, 9 (C.M.A. 1991) (parental compulsion found to be
a form of constructive force); United States v. Henderson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 268, 273, 15 C.M.R. 268,
273 (1954) (concept of constructive force recognized as applicable to military)).
12

DEP’T OF DEF., ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 27 (2011) [hereinafter
2010 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT] (citing previous year’s report and DTFSAMS REPORT 2009,
infra note 117) stated:
[P]ractitioners consistently advised [Defense] Task Force [on Sexual Assault in the
Military (DTFSAMS)] members that the new Article 120 (effective October 1, 2007) is
cumbersome and confusing. Prosecutors expressed concern that Article 120 may cause
unwarranted acquittals. In addition, significant issues related to the constitutionality of
Article 120’s statutory affirmative defense of and consent to lesser-included offenses
have evolved.
13

Military offenders may also be tried by non-military federal and state civilian authorities
pursuant to federal and state criminal law.
14

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No.
108–375, 118 Stat. 1811, 1920 (2004). In 2005, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment &
Violence at the Military Service Academies further highlighted the problems with the existing UCMJ
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primarily used to prosecute cases on Indian reservations and were seldom applied,
and therefore, rarely reviewed on appeal.16 In response to Congress’ request, a
sex offenses, finding that “a key obstacle to increasing accountability for rape and sexual assault is
that current statutes, though flexible, do not reflect the full spectrum of criminal sexual behaviors
encountered at the military service academies and society at large,” and recommended “Congress
revise the current sexual misconduct statutes to more clearly and comprehensively address the full
range of sexual misconduct.” REP. OF THE DEF. TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE
AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES ES–2 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 DTF ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
& VIOLENCE REPORT].
15
On December 31, 2011, P.L. 112-81, Div A, Title V, Subtitle D, § 541(a), 125 Stat. 1404,
the current version of UCMJ, art. 120, 10 U.S.C. 920 was signed into law and became effective 180
days after enactment (for offenses committed on or after June 28, 2012) as provided by § 541(f) of
the Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 843 note. The version of Article 120 becoming effective on
June 28, 2012, will be referred to hereinafter as “2012 Article 120.” The 2012 Article 120 is similar
to Title 18, but the latter does not have definitions and the offenses include the term “knowingly.”
The term “knowingly” is used in many Title 18 offenses to indicate the requisite acts were not done
inadvertently or by accident. For the sex offenses in 18 U.S.C. §§ 224144 (2006), the government
need not prove the touching of the victim was for sexual gratification. Under military law, mistake is
an affirmative defense. Most Title 18 offenses include the word “knowingly” and most military
offenses do not. The concept of “knowingly” is automatically incorporated into UCMJ offenses.
See, e.g., 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 1.b(2)(a). The definitions in 2012 Article 120 and 18
U.S.C. § 2246 (2006) of “sexual act” require a sexual penetration of the body of the victim versus
“sexual contact,” which only requires a sexual touching of the body of the victim. Penetration of the
victim’s body makes the offense more aggravated. Using the definitions of sexual act and sexual
contact is a very efficient way to list offenses. The definitions are somewhat involved and taking
them out of the offense and putting them into a definition section makes it easier for the practitioner
to recognize what is different between the two offenses. Of course, some might describe this as
“cumbersome” because they are not trained in how to apply non-UCMJ statutes. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MILITARY JUSTICE: OVERSIGHT AND
BETTER COLLABORATION NEEDED FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS 22
(Jun. 2011).
16

In FY 2009, the nation’s tribes Uniform Crime Report indicated 882 forcible rapes, and in
FY 2010, they reported 852 rapes. STEVEN W. PERRY, TRIBAL CRIME DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES
9 (Dep’t of Justice, Oct. 2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tcdca12.pdf. Convictions
for sexual abuse of adults from 2007 to 2012 varied from eighty-seven to 137 per year in U.S.
District Courts. Lisa M. Schenck, Informing the Debate About Sexual Assault in the Military
Services: Is the Department of Defense Its Own Worst Enemy?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 579, 627
n.214 (2014) and accompanying chart (citations omitted). In 2009 and 2011, ninety-seven percent of
trials in U.S. District Court were guilty pleas. Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the
Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3599; 3602–11 (2013). Of the sexual abuse cases where the defendants pled not guilty and were
convicted, a fraction resulted in jury trials which involved instructions on offenses, evidence,
burdens, and lesser-included offenses. Consequently, few sexual abuse cases ever undergo appellate
review or are reversed for legal errors concerning instructions. From 2007 to 2011, the most recent
years of statistics available, there were only 154 convictions of sexual abuse offenses after contested
trials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–44, 2250. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATABASE,
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/tsec.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). An individual may be convicted of
more than one Title 18 offense at a single trial. From 2006 to 2010, eighty-six sexual abuse offenses
were reversed or remanded on appeal, and thirty-three cases were partially affirmed on appeal. Id.
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subcommittee of the Joint Service Committee [JSC] provided an 826-page report
focused on statutory changes to assist Congress in bringing the UCMJ up to date
with the latest state and federal sex offense statutes.17 The Subcommittee
members, however, concluded that change was unnecessary, stating:
[We] were unable to identify any sexual conduct (that the military has an
interest in prosecuting) that [could not] be prosecuted under the current
UCMJ and [Manual for Courts-Martial]18 . . . [and] unanimously
concluded that change [was] not required. [And a] majority of the
subcommittee believed that the rationale for significant change was
outweighed by the confusion and disruption that such change would
cause.19
Despite the Subcommittee’s assertion that change was not required, “the
[S]ubcommittee . . . concluded that if Congress direct[ed] a UCMJ change to
substantially conform to Title 18, Option 5 [was] the alternative that best [took]
into account unique military requirements.”20 In 2006, Congress implemented
Option 5 and created a “new” Article 120 (effective October 2007),21 which
outlined sexual assault offenses. In 2011, Congress created additional changes to
Article 120 (effective June 2012)22 and revamped available defenses. This Article
contends that some of these changes are beneficial, but further modifications
should be made.
A. Article 120 Changes Effective October 1, 2007 [2007 Article 120]
In the past ten years, Congress has changed statutory sex offenses and
applicable burdens of proof twice.23 In 2006, Congress created a “new” Article
120 modeled after the Title 18 sexual assault offenses. The 2006 changes are the

Many of those cases likely involved litigation over application of sentencing guidelines rather than
instructions on elements of offenses, lesser-included offenses, burdens, and defenses.
17

See 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8.

18

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2005) [hereinafter 2005 MCM].

19

2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8, at 1.

20

Id.

21

See 2007 Article 120, supra note 7.

22

2012 MCM, supra note 6, Appendix 28, at ¶ 45.

23
The 2012 MCM, supra note 6, contains the punitive articles, elements of offenses, and
some definitions applicable to sex offenses committed before October 1, 2007 at Appendix 27;
committed between October 1, 2007 through June 27, 2012 at Appendix 28; and committed after
June 27, 2012 at pt. IV, ¶ 45.
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most significant statutory changes to military substantive criminal offenses since
enactment of the 1950 version of the UCMJ. Specifically, the new Article 120 set
forth a gradation of sex offenses based on aggravating factors, establishing the
following categories:
(a) rape; (b) rape of a child; (c) aggravated sexual assault; (d) aggravated
sexual assault of a child; (e) aggravated sexual contact; (f) aggravated
sexual abuse of a child; (g) aggravated sexual contact with a child; (h)
abusive sexual contact; (i) abusive sexual contact with a child; (j)
indecent liberty with a child; (k) indecent act; (l) forcible pandering; (m)
wrongful sexual contact; and (n) indecent exposure.24
The changes in 2006 also included definitions of numerous terms25 and
limitations on the two most common affirmative defenses—consent and mistake of
fact as to consent—which were not specifically included in the previous UCMJ sex
offenses and were not included in Title 18. These definitions served to fill a
widening gap, created due to appellate decisions, which continuously modified the
scope of offenses and changed instructions trial judges were required to provide to
court members (i.e., the jury). In the past, military courts relied on case-law-based
definitions, which trial judges used to instruct the court members regarding the
offenses. This became problematic with appellate courts occasionally deciding to
change a definition or, in some cases, condemning the instruction a trial judge had
used without providing a model definition or instruction.26 A vicious cycle
developed with trial judges crafting instructions and appellate courts reversing
cases. By providing statutory definitions in the 2006 provisions, trial judges were
able to simply read the definitions to the court members, vastly simplifying the
trial process and providing transparency to the UCMJ, as the definitions of
offenses were no longer buried in case law.
Furthermore, the new Article 120 effective in 2007: (1) moved the following
Article 13427 sex offenses (“Indecent Assault,” “Indecent Acts or Liberties with a
24
2007 Article 120, supra note 7; see also Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Johnson, Forks in the
Road: Recent Developments in Substantive Criminal Law, 2006 ARMY LAW. 23, 27 (Jun. 2006).
25
Definitions in the 2007 Article 120 include: (1) sexual act; (2) sexual contact; (3) grievous
bodily harm; (4) dangerous weapon or object; (5) force; (6) threatening or placing another in fear
under (a) rape or (e) aggravated sexual contact; (7) threatening or placing another in fear under (c)
aggravated sexual assault or (h) abusive sexual contact; (8) bodily harm; (9) child; (10) lewd act; (11)
indecent liberty; and (12) indecent conduct.
26

A brief description of courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses such as rape, and the
changing jurisprudence of rape prosecutions in the military over the last hundred years is provided in
2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8.
27

UCMJ, art. 134 [hereinafter Article 134]; 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶¶ 61113.
Article 134 prohibits “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and
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Child,” “Indecent Exposure,” and “Indecent Acts with Another”) to Article 120;
(2) amended Article 134’s “Indecent Language” communicated to another;28 and
(3) added “compelled” pandering (coercing a person to commit prostitution) as an
offense.29 These offenses were crimes in the majority of state jurisdictions.
Transferring these Article 134 offenses to Article 120 was beneficial for two
reasons: (1) the requirement to prove that the offense was prejudicial to good order
and discipline or service discrediting conduct as an element of the offense no
longer existed, and (2) Article 120 was an offense that the legislative branch
created with statutory elements and definitions, rather than an Article 134 offense
promulgated by a Presidential Executive Order.30
Essentially, the JSC Subcommittee concluded that these Article 120 revisions
provided the following advantages:
1. All citizens, military or civilian, [would] face similar prohibitions.
2. [S]ex[ ] crimes [would be divided] into degrees based on culpability
of defendant.
3. [M]ore specific notice of prohibited conduct [would be provided]
because offenses are more detailed (compare Article 120, UCMJ with 18
U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B)).31
offenses not capital,” which includes application of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §
13 (2006). 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 60a.
28
This offense remains an Article 134 offense, but “the communication of indecent language .
. . in the physical presence of a child” is now prohibited under Article 120. See 2012 MCM, supra
note 6, at ¶ 89c.
29

2006 Article 120, supra note 7; Defense Sexual Trauma Response Oversight and Good
Governance Act, S. 1018, 112th Cong. (2011). Pandering remained an Article 134 offense. Article
134; 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 97.
30
The enumerated punitive articles in the UCMJ receive greater deference from the CAAF
than offenses generated by the President and the Executive Branch. “It is well established that when
the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.” Lamie v. United States Trustee,
540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). CAAF accords
minimal deference to the President’s generation of offenses. Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 92 (C.M.A.
1988) (“President’s rulemaking authority does not extend to substantive military criminal law.”). See
also United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (holding the President’s description of
the affirmative defense of self defense in the MCM was incomplete).
31
The pre-2007 version of Article 120(a) defined rape as: “Any person subject to this chapter
who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be
punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.” 2006 Article 120, supra
note 7. Sexual abuse is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) (2006), which provides:

Whoever [jurisdictional statement] . . . knowingly— . . . (2) engages in a sexual act with
another person if that other person is— . . . (B) physically incapable of declining
participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; or
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any term of years or
for life.
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4. [The g]overnment’s requirement to prove lack of consent as an
element [would be eliminated] –reduc[ing] an implied element that [the]
victim must resist.
5. [M]ost serious sex[] offenses [would be consolidated] under one
UCMJ article.32
B. Article 120 Changes Effective June 28, 2012 [2012 Article 120]—Article 120
Today: Analysis, Problems, and Recommendations
Congress further created changes to Article 120, making some improvements
to the military’s basic sex offense statute; however, some changes were counterproductive. Effective June 28, 2012, the sex offenses in Article 120 were
separated into three distinct sub-sections: Article 120(a) for adult victims, Article
120(b) for child victims, and Article 120(c) for other sex offenses. The
reorganization placed the following offenses under Article 120(a): (a) rape, (b)
sexual assault, (c) aggravated sexual contact, and (d) abusive sexual contact.
Article 120(b) defined the same four offenses in relation to child victims. Other
changes made may prove to be problematic for prosecutors and, as a result, for
victims. The military services continue to face statutory difficulties in prosecuting
sexual assault offenses that could be corrected with further statutory changes to
Article 120. Existing problems include the following: the 2012 Article 120
changes eliminated “Indecent Act” as an offense, included a problematic definition
of force, inappropriately increased the emphasis on whether the victim’s fears are
reasonable, shifted the focus to the accused’s perceptions of whether the victim
was consenting, and eliminated the burden shift for the affirmative defenses of
consent and mistake of fact as to consent. While the DoD and Congress are
considering different ways of correcting some of these problems (as noted in
footnote 123, infra), this Article recommends addressing these issues by legislative
action as suggested in the following section.
1. Indecent Act Offense Eliminated
The 2012 Article 120 legislative revision continued the trend set in 2007 by
making some offenses more specific. The legislation created two new offenses
that at most will affect a handful of cases each year: Article 120(b)(2) subsections
(C) and (D). These offenses prohibit sexual assault by “making a fraudulent
representation that the sexual act serves a professional purpose;” and “inducing a

Essentially, if an accused has sexual intercourse with an intoxicated woman who cannot
communicate her unwillingness to engage in sexual intercourse, he has a markedly greater chance of
being convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) than he would have under the pre-2007 version of
Article 120(a) because the vague, amorphous concepts in Article 120(a) left more room for
reasonable doubt.
32
2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8, at 6.
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belief by any artifice, pretense, or concealment that the person is another person.”33
The revisions also eliminated the catch-all offense of “Indecent Act,”34 which is
not included in the offenses counted in the DoD sex offense reports.35 This
legislative revision also merged the offense of wrongful sexual contact into abusive
sexual contact, which will affect about one-third of the sexual assault cases.36
In the 2007 revision of Article 120(k), “Indecent Acts with Another” was
moved from Article 134 to Article 120, eliminating the element of prejudicial to
good order and discipline or service discrediting conduct, and the President
removed “Indecent Acts with Another” as an offense under Article 134.37
“Indecent Acts with Another”38 traditionally proscribed a variety of sexual
misconduct not otherwise prohibited, such as consensual sexual intercourse in the
presence of others39 and sex acts with an animal or a corpse.40 Under the 2007
33

10 U.S.C. 120(b)(1)(C), (D) (2012); see also 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra
note 8, at 503–04 (citing CAL. PEN. CODE § 261(a)(4)(D), (5)).
34
Paragraph 90 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2008), “Indecent acts with
another” was deleted by Executive Order 13447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56179 (Oct. 2, 2007). See 2012 MCM,
supra note 6, at Apps. 25, 27. In the 2007 version, “Indecent Act” was moved from Article 134 to
Article 120(k).
35
See DEP’T OF DEF., I ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 3 (2012) [hereinafter
2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, VOL. I]. Wrongful sexual contact (580 offenses) and abusive
sexual contact (308 offenses) were the most serious sex offenses cited in 35% of the unrestricted
reports (2,558 offenses). Id. at 62. If a subject commits a rape and wrongful sexual contact, the
offense for statistical purposes in the 2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT VOL. I is counted as the
most serious offense: rape. Thus, the number of wrongful sexual contact offenses may be
substantially higher. DEP’T OF DEF., II ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY (2012)
[hereinafter 2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, VOL. II].
36
2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 35, at 62.
37
2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 90 (“90. Deleted—See Appendix 27 Indecent acts
with another was deleted by Executive Order 13447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56179 (Oct. 2, 2007). See
Appendix 25.”). The 2007 Article 120 revision adopted the traditional maximum punishment for
indecent acts from Article 134 of dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
confinement for five years. Compare 2012 MCM, supra note 6, App. 27, at ¶ 90(e) (Article 134
offense of indecent act), with 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 45(f)(6) (2007 Article 120
offense of indecent act).
38

2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8, at 87, 199.

39

See United States v. Tollinchi, 54 M.J. 80, 83 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Brundidge,
17 M.J. 586, 587 (A.C.M.R. 1983).
40

United States v. Sanchez, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 221, 29 C.M.R. 32, 34 (1960) (holding anal
sodomy of a chicken is indecent per se); United States v. Mabie, 24 M.J. 711, 713 (A.C.M.R. 1987)
(determining sex acts with corpse are indecent); see also United States v. McDaniel, 39 M.J. 173, 175
(C.M.A. 1994) (finding it an indecent act to instruct female recruits to disrobe, change positions, and
bounce up and down while videotaping them without their knowledge); United States v. Proctor, 34
M.J. 549, 557–59 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992) (holding it was an indecent act to spank young boys on the bare
buttocks). The 2007 Article 120 also prohibited viewing and various types of photography and
videotaping of intimate actions of another without permission, based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3404(1.7) (2004). The definition of “indecent conduct” in the 2007 Article 120(t)(12) includes
voyeurism and unauthorized videotaping as crimes. See 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra
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Article 120, the “Indecent Act” offense was a lesser-included offense for most sex
offenses under Article 120.41
The 2012 version, however, inexplicably deleted the prohibited “indecent”
conduct from Article 120, which is even more problematic due to the removal of
“Indecent Acts with Another” from Article 134 in 2007.42 Despite the
congressional (Article 120 revisions) and presidential changes (Article 134
modification), “indecent” conduct may still be a chargeable offense under Article
134 (general article), an offense prejudicial to good order and discipline or service
discrediting conduct. Furthermore, the DoD seems to have recognized this issue
and, on October 23, 2012, proposed adding the new offense of “Indecent Conduct”
to Article 134.43 Nevertheless, prosecuting indecent conduct offenses pursuant to
Article 134—either as a general article violation or one as proposed by the DoD—
requires proving beyond a reasonable doubt an additional element of proof,
note 8, at 195 n.694 (describing Colorado law as the source for this provision). The 2012 Article 120
specifically added broadcasting and distributing a recording of a person engaged in intimate actions
to the videotaping and viewing prohibitions. 2012 Article 120c(a)(4)–(5). Under both the 2007 and
2012 versions of Article 120 the fact finder must determine whether the conduct at issue is indecent;
the statute provides a definition of indecent taken from traditional military case law. Military law
also recognizes that some sex acts at the appellate level are “indecent conduct per se.” United States
v. Littlewood, 53 M.J. 349, 353 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (holding sexual activity between a twelve-year-old
girl and her natural father was indecent per se).
41

See 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶¶ d(2)(a), d(6)(a), d(7)(a), d(9)(a), d(10)(a), e(1),
e(3), e(5)(a), e(5)(c), e(5)(d), e(5)(e), e(8).
42

Paragraph 90 of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2008), which
prohibited indecent acts under Article 134, was deleted by Executive Order 13447, 72 Fed. Reg.
56179 (Oct. 2, 2007). See 2012 MCM, supra note 6, at Apps. 25, 27. The 2007 Article 120 followed
the traditional military justice scheme and included indecent statements or indecent exposure to a
child as a separate offense from indecently touching a child. See 2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at
subsection (j) (prohibiting indecent liberties with a child); 2012 MCM, supra note 6, App. 27, at ¶ 87
(“Article 134—(Indecent acts or liberties with a child)”). The 2012 Article 120 merged the two
offenses and prohibited four types of lewd acts in the expanded sexual abuse of a child offense in
2012 Article 120b(c) by incorporating the offenses into a complex definition of “lewd act” in 2012
Article 120b(h)(5). “This combination of offenses was intended to capture the gravamen of the
offenses while maintaining the simplicity that was desired for counsel, judges, and members. Any
lewd act with a child of any age is punishable under this subsection.” See Arts. 120, 120b, 120c, 43,
and 118, UCMJ – DOD PROPOSED NDAA FY 11 AMENDMENTS, as included in S. 3454 BY SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, JUNE 4, 2010 16 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 DOD PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS].
43
Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 205, October 23, 2012, 64865–66 proposes that the offense
of Indecent Conduct be added to the Manual for Courts-Martial, explaining that, “Indecent conduct
includes offenses previously prescribed by ‘Indecent acts with another’ except that the presence of
another person is no longer required. For purposes of this offense, the words ‘conduct’ and ‘act’ are
synonymous.” Id. at 64866. The proposed offense of indecent conduct will have the following
elements: “(1) That the accused engaged in a certain conduct; (2) That the conduct was indecent; and
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the [A]rmed [F]orces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the [A]rmed [F]orces.”
Id. at 64865–66. The new manual provision also defines the term “indecent.” Id. at 64866.
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conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.
Additionally, Article 134 offenses do not receive the same degree of judicial
deference from CAAF as statute-based offenses.44 Thus, prohibiting indecent
conduct or indecent acts under Article 134 is problematic at the trial level for the
prosecutor who must prove the additional element, and at the appellate level,
where the MCM provision is given limited deference. These weaknesses are not
present if the conduct is prohibited in a statutory provision within Article 120.
Adding the offense of “Indecent Acts” into Article 120 (as reflected in the
proposed legislation in the Appendix to this article) would be more beneficial for
the government. The 2007 offense of “Indecent Act” in Article 120(k) along with
the definition of the term “indecent conduct” in Article 120(t)(12) should be
returned to the UCMJ as a statutory catch-all offense.
2. Revised Definition of Force
The 2012 Article 120(g)(5) defines “force” as:
(A) the use of a weapon;
(B) the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to
overcome, restrain, or injure a person,45 or
(C) inflicting physical harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by
the victim46
The 2012 Article 120 limits “force” to situations where a weapon is used as
opposed to displayed or suggested. Article 120(g)(5)(C) was changed from
“sufficient that the other person could not avoid or escape the sexual conduct” to
two degrees of force: (B) “sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person” and
(C) “sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim.” Under the current
Article 120’s definition, unlike the 2007 version, the degree of force to compel the
victim’s submission is more subjective and places less emphasis on whether the
44

See supra note 30.

45
See United States v. Johnson, 492 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting 18 U.S.C. §
2241(a)(1) requires force “sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person; or the use of a threat of
harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim”); United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d
747, 754 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1990))
(“A force sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . includes ‘the use of such physical force as is sufficient
to overcome, restrain or injure a person; or the use of a threat of harm sufficient to coerce or compel
submission by the victim.’”); United States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of . . . the use of such physical force as is
sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person . . . .”).
46
The rationale for the amendment of the force definition was to simplify it from its previous
iteration. 2012 MCM, supra note 6, App. 23, at ¶ 45. The physical harm “sufficient to coerce or
compel submission by the victim” language is from Johnson, 492 F.3d at 257. The threat component
is defined in Article 120(g)(7).
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victim had the opportunity to escape or avoid the sexual assault.47 However, to
better protect victims, the definition of force should include suggesting possession
of a dangerous weapon. Article 120(g)(5) should include: “(A) the use, display, or
the suggestion of use, of a weapon.”48
3. The “Reasonable Person” Restriction for Victims
In addition to addressing “Indecent Acts with Another” and the definition of
force, the DoD should also solicit Congress to change the definition of
“threatening or placing a person in fear” to recognize and protect vulnerable
victims. The 2012 Article 120(g)(7) defines “threatening or placing that other
person in fear” as “a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to
cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another
person being subjected to the wrongful action contemplated by the communication
or action.”49 The 2012 Article 120(g)(7) requires a showing of the victim’s
“reasonable fear,” as opposed to proof of the victim’s subjective fear, thus giving
47
Jim Clark, Analysis of Crimes and Defenses 2012 UCMJ Article 120, effective 28 June
2012,
2012
LEXIS
EMERGING
ISSUES
6423
(2012),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20120705060050_large.pdf. See also Major Jennifer S.
Knies, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ’s Rape Law Missed the Mark, and
How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put it Back on Target, 2007 ARMY LAW. 1, 6 (2007). The
2007 Article 120(t)(5)(C) provided one of three components of force to be, “action to compel
submission of another or to overcome or prevent another’s resistance by . . . (C) physical violence,
strength, power, or restraint applied to another person, sufficient that the other person could not avoid
or escape the sexual conduct.”
48

The 2007 Article 120 included “(A) the use or display of a dangerous weapon or object.”
2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (t)(5). Rhode Island provides an example of a
definition of force that includes the “threat of use:”
(2) “Force or coercion” means when the accused does any of the following:
(i) Uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to
lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon.
(ii) Overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or physical
violence.
(iii) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim
and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the present ability to execute
these threats.
(iv) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to at some time in the future murder,
inflict serious bodily injury upon or kidnap the victim or any other person and the victim
reasonably believes that the accused has the ability to execute this threat.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(2) (2014); see State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 473–74 (R.I. 2013)
(citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 and holding separate “consent” instruction not required where jury
instructed on force or coercion element).
49

2012 Article 120, supra note 15, at subsection (g)(7) (emphasis added).
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greater weight to the victim’s mental state in deciding whether to comply with
demands for sex. As a result, an accused may benefit by selecting a more
vulnerable victim who may comply through fear; such a vulnerable victim may
succumb in response to a lower level communication or action than that required to
meet the “reasonable” person standard. The phrase “a reasonable fear” should be
replaced with “the victim to fear.”
4. Eliminate Charge Based on the Accused’s Perception of the Victim’s
Behavior
Another provision in the 2012 Article 120 that should be modified is the
provision that results in focusing on the accused’s perception of the victim’s
behavior. The 2012 Article 120(b)(2)(3) describes “sexual assault” as when an
accused:
(2) commits a sexual act upon another person when the person knows or
reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or
otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring; or
(3) commits a sexual act upon another person when the other person is
incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to—
(A) impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and
that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the person; or
(B) a mental disease or defect, or physical disability, and that condition
is known or reasonably should be known by the person; is guilty of
sexual assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.50
This statutory provision requires the government to prove that the accused
“knows or reasonably should know” the victim’s state of consciousness. Even if
the victim testifies about her capacity to consent or ability to resist, the government
must prove the accused’s knowledge or at least that the accused should have
known. The accused may testify and describe the victim’s behavior to disprove his
knowledge of the victim’s condition and support the defense theory of mistake of
fact as to consent.
To further protect victims, this additional element should be deleted and the
following language from the 2007 Article 120(c), the offense of aggravated sexual
assault51 should be imported into Article 120:

50

2012 Article 120, supra note 15, at subsections (b)(2)(3) (emphasis added).
elements are also contained in the definition of “marriage” in 2012 Article 120b(f).
51

These

The 2012 amendment to Article 120 changed the name of the offense and deleted the term
“aggravated.”
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[a]ny person . . . who—(2) engages in a sexual act with another person of
any age, if that other person is substantially incapacitated or substantially
incapable of—(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act; (B) declining
participating in the sexual act; or (C) communicating unwillingness to
engage in the sexual act; is guilty of aggravated sexual assault.52
This provision primarily reflected the Title 18 offense of sexual abuse,53 with
the addition of the word “substantially” which was added in this proposed
language to reduce the possibility that the fact finder might acquit based on the
belief that the victim might need to be completely incapable of appraising the
nature of the conduct or communicating unwillingness to engage in the sex act.
Under the proposed provision, the victim need only testify that she lacked capacity
or was intoxicated to the extent where she was incapable of resisting the
defendant’s advances or consenting to the sexual activity because she was asleep,
passed out from alcohol, or too impaired to communicate lack of consent.
5. Affirmative Defenses of Consent and Mistake of Fact as to Consent
The 2012 Article 120 included changes in response to an appellate case that
provided a review of the affirmative defense of consent. One of the 2012 changes,
the elimination of the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent from the
statute, should be reconsidered.
i. Affirmative Defense of Consent and Burden Shifting
The 2007 Article 120(r) limited the applicability of the affirmative defenses of
consent and mistake of fact as to consent to specific offenses54 and added a
52

2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (c)(2).

53

Title 18 criminalized the following:
Whoever . . . knowingly (1) causes another person to engage in a sexual act by
threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing
that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily
injury, or kidnapping); or (2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other
person is (A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or (B) physically
incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in,
that sexual act; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for
any term of years or for life.

18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2007).
54

2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (r) stated:

(r) Consent and mistake of fact as to consent. Lack of permission is an element of the
offense in subsection (m) (wrongful sexual contact). Consent and mistake of fact as to
consent are not an issue, or an affirmative defense, in a prosecution under any other
subsection, except they are an affirmative defense for the sexual conduct in issue in a
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provision (similar to other affirmative defenses) establishing an initial burden of
preponderance of evidence before the prosecution had the burden of proving these
affirmative defenses did not exist.55 The defense’s requirement to fulfill an initial
burden as to consent was based on District of Columbia Code § 22-3007, which
provided, “[c]onsent by the victim is a defense which the defendant must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence.”56
Affirmative defenses involving a shift in the burden of proof are not unusual
in criminal law.57 For example, the defendant has a specified initial burden58 in

prosecution under subsection (a) (rape), subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault),
subsection (e) (aggravated sexual contact), and subsection (h) (abusive sexual contact).
55

2007 Article 120, id. at (t)(16) stated:

Affirmative defense. The term “affirmative defense” means any special defense which,
although not denying that the accused committed the objective acts constituting the
offense charged, denies, wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility for those acts. The
accused has the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of
evidence. After the defense meets this burden, the prosecution shall have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the affirmative defense did not exist.
56
In Russell v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the
constitutionality of this statute, but cautioned “that the jury should be expressly instructed that it may
consider the affirmative defense evidence when it determines whether the government has met its
burden to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” 698 A.2d 1007, 1015–16
(D.C. 1997). D.C. Law 1888 amended D.C. CODE §§ 22-3002–07 in 2009, deleting “which the
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence” following “a defense.” See also Hatch
v. United States, 35 A.3d 1115, 1125 (D.C. 2011) (reversing because of confusion over burdens in
instructions relating to consent in sexual abuse prosecution); Gaynor v. United States, 16 A.3d 944,
94546 (D.C. 2011) (same).
57
See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, §
303.06[1] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2013) (discussing presumptions in affirmative defenses in
criminal cases).
58
In most jurisdictions, the judiciary through case law determines what evidence is sufficient
to meet the burden, but the judiciary has not set a bright-line rule determining how much evidence is
necessary to meet that burden:

[T]he precise dimensions of this burden of production remain inexact; [courts] have
established no bright-line rule . . . as to the quantum of proof which will enable the
proponent to cross the threshold and warrant a charge to the jury . . . [The case has not yet
arisen] to delineate what evidence actually suffices to meet the defense’s burden of
production.
United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 81214 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (stating
that placing the burden of providing some evidence “on a criminal defendant is by no means
unprecedented”). For example, “[e]ntrapment consists of two prongs: (1) improper [g]overnment
inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the
criminal conduct.” United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2001) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Once the defendant meets his initial burden of showing
entitlement to an instruction on the [entrapment] defense, the burden shifts to the government to
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raising the affirmative defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence,59 selfdefense by a preponderance of evidence,60 and all affirmative defenses in
trafficking in counterfeit goods by a preponderance of evidence.61
Nevertheless, in 2011, CAAF agreed with defense assertions that the defense
burden to establish “consent,” by a preponderance of evidence involved an
unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof to the accused in a case involving
the victim’s intoxication. The Prather court stated:
If an accused proves that the victim consented, he has necessarily proven
that the victim had the capacity to consent, which logically results in the
accused having disproven an element of the offense of aggravated sexual
assault—that the victim was substantially incapacitated . . . . [O]ne
principle remains constant—an affirmative defense may not shift the
burden of disproving any element of the offense to the defense.62
prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that there was no undue government pressure or trickery or
that the defendant was predisposed.” Id. at 4445 (internal citations omitted).
59
See, e.g., United States v. Waagner, 319 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that under
18 U.S.C. § 17(b), the defendant “must carry the burden of proving insanity (which is an affirmative
defense) by clear and convincing evidence”). The Eighth Circuit explained:
We believe that this statutorily imposed higher burden of proof calls for a correlating
higher standard for determining the quantum of evidence necessary to entitle a defendant
to such an instruction . . . . The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the
following standard to define the quantum of evidence necessary to obtain an insanity
instruction: where the issue of insanity has otherwise been properly raised, a federal
criminal defendant is due a jury instruction on insanity when the evidence would allow a
reasonable jury to find that insanity has been shown with convincing clarity.
United States v. Long Crow, 37 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted); see
also UCMJ, art. 50a(b),10 U.S.C.A. § 850a(b) (stating that the accused must prove affirmative
defense of lack of mental responsibility by clear and convincing evidence).
60

Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 156365 (4th Cir. 1989) (As self-defense is an affirmative
defense, the defendant could properly be given the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a
preponderance of evidence.).
61
See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c) (“All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies .
. . shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section . . . [and] the defendant shall have the burden
of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of any such affirmative defense.”); United States v.
McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1173 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding the imposition of the burden of proof for
affirmative defenses on the defendant is constitutional because the “statute still requires that the
government prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt”). Also, under The
Victim and Witness Protection Act, the defendant’s affirmative defense must meet the initial burden
by providing a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) “the conduct consisted solely of lawful
conduct,” and 2) “that defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person
to testify truthfully.” 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(e) (2008).
62

United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338, 343 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding that Article 120, by
placing the burden on the accused to raise the issue of consent as an affirmative defense to a sexual
assault prosecution and then shifting the burden to the defense to disprove an implied element of the
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The court found the initial burden shift was unconstitutional, and the second
burden shift, while moot in the case at bar, was “a legal impossibility.”63 The
Prather decision was controversial in part because it essentially restored consent as
an implied element in intoxication-based sex offenses, even though Congress had
eliminated “without consent” from the 2007 Article 120.
In the wake of the Prather decision, the DoD recommended that Congress
eliminate the initial burden that the accused show consent by a preponderance of
the evidence.64 Specifically, the DoD requested that Congress repeal Articles
120(r) and 120(t)(16), without explaining how deleting consent and mistake of fact
as to consent as affirmative defenses improved Article 120 for prosecutors, judges,
court members, or victims.
Unfortunately, by removing the provisions describing these affirmative
defenses, Congress may have removed the clear statutory definition of mistake of
fact as to consent and may have returned “consent” of the victim as an implied
element of force in intoxication-based sex crimes. In effect, this may return
victims to the statutory situation under the original 1950 Article 120 when the
UCMJ became law. In the absence of clear statutory language, the courts will
resolve these critical issues on a case-by-case basis, which will in all likelihood

offense in violation of due process, created a legal impossibility); see also United States v. Medina,
69 M.J. 462, 46566 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding that instructions that included consent as a defense to
the charge of aggravated sexual assault and the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that consent did not exist were harmless error where the members were not
instructed of the statutory scheme that required an accused to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the victim consented).
63

Prather, 69 M.J. at 345 (footnote omitted).

64

2010 DOD PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 42. The proposed amendments provide:

The definition of consent was left generally unchanged. The restrictions on the use of
evidence of consent were deleted. The circular language in the current law using nearly
the same words to explain the interaction of consent and capacity, as were used to define
an offense under Sexual Assault, was deleted. The Constitutional and other legal issues
that have developed in litigation regarding Article 120, as amended in 2007, are resolved.
The treatment of consent is simplified and may be disputed where it is relevant.
Categories of persons who may not legally give consent to sexual acts or contact are set
forth within the statute to simplify the matters at issue in court. For example, the
proposed change makes it clear that sleeping or unconscious persons cannot consent. At
least two court members’ panels within the last year have acquitted in sexual assault
cases due to confusion over this issue. Persons subjected to a fraudulent representation of
a professional purpose to accomplish the act, or under the belief that the person
committing the act is another person, cannot consent because they do not understand to
what they are consenting. Lack of consent was made a permissive inference based on the
circumstances of the offense.
Id. at 15.
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result in a lack of predictability and consistency, and, inevitably, hard won
convictions being reversed on appeal.
ii. Affirmative Defense of Mistake of Fact as to Consent.
The 2012 Article 120 contains a definition of consent but does not provide
clear language about mistake of fact as to consent. This leaves military judges
without a statutory definition from which to craft a jury instruction.
Some states have determined that the “mistake of fact as to consent”
instruction is not constitutionally required and the consent instruction is
sufficient.65 “As a general proposition, a defendant is entitled to an instruction as
to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a
reasonable jury to find in his favor.”66 Nevertheless, Massachusetts law provides
that “mistake of fact as to consent . . has very little application” to the rape statute,
which “does not require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s lack of
consent or intent to engage in nonconsensual intercourse as a material element of
the offense.”67
Moreover, in Massachusetts, the defendant’s “perception
(reasonable, honest, or otherwise) . . . as to the victim’s consent is consequently
not relevant to a rape prosecution.”68 In U.S. District Courts, the trial judges are
not required to provide a mistake of fact as to consent instruction.69
65
In Clifton v. Commonwealth, the defendant claimed that he had a prior sexual relationship
with the victim and that she consented on the date of the offense. 468 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Va. Ct. App.
1996). The trial judge instructed the jury, “[c]onsent by [the victim] is an absolute bar to conviction
of rape. If, after consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether [the
victim] consented to have intercourse with him, then you shall find him not guilty.” Id. The
defendant asked for the following instruction:

If you find the defendant actually believed that [the victim] was consenting to have
sexual intercourse, and if his belief was reasonable, then you shall find him not guilty.
The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant either knew that [the victim] did not consent to sexual intercourse, or that a
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have known that [the victim] did
not consent to sexual intercourse.
Id. at 158.
The Clifton court noted that the defendant “may testify as to his observations or perceptions of
statements or conduct by the victim suggesting consent.” Id. However, the trial judge is not required
to instruct the jury on the defendant’s perceptions of the victim’s consent. Id.
66

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852
(6th Cir. 2002).
67

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Mass. 2001).

68
Id. (citing Rosana Cavallaro, Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About
Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 818 (1996)).
69
Aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat in the 2007 Article 120 was derived from 18
U.S.C. § 2241(a). In United States v. Martin, the accused was charged with aggravated sexual abuse
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As for the military, the CAAF has pointed out that the fact finder must be
instructed to consider all evidence (including the evidence the accused raises that is
pertinent to the affirmative defense) when determining whether the prosecution
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.70 Prior to the major Article 120
by force or threat under 18 U.S.C. §2241(a). 528 F.3d 746, 75253 (10th Cir. 2008). Although there
was evidence of the defendant’s prior consensual sexual relationship with the victim, Martin did not
testify on the merits. His attorney requested the following instruction:
Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur. Consent may be manifested by action
or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor. If words or conduct are
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent
consent and are as effective as consent in fact.
Id. at 753.
The Tenth Circuit noted that the instructions correctly stated the law and required “the
government to prove that threat or force caused the sexual act.” Id. The Martin court explained the
role of consent and mistake of fact as to consent as follows:
Under the statute, actual consent is relevant to the extent it negates the required causation.
But merely apparent consent does not negate causation, because it is apparent, not real. It
is therefore not necessarily true that “apparent consent” is “as effective as consent in
fact.” “Apparent consent” might be relevant to disproving a defendant’s mens rea in
some cases, but only by negating knowingness, the second element of the crime, not by
negating the causation requirement embodied in the first and third. The proffered
instruction improperly equated actual and apparent consent, and also failed to explain
how either form of consent related to the elements the jury was required to find.
Id.
In United States v. Rivera, the trial judge instructed the jury “that to find Rivera guilty of
aggravated sexual abuse, they had to conclude, inter alia, that he caused Natasha ‘to engage in a
sexual act by: (a) the use of force against Natasha; or (b) by threatening or placing her in fear that any
person will be subjected to death or serious bodily [injury].’” 43 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 1995).
Rivera’s defenses were that he did not use force and that the victim consensually engaged in
intercourse rather than out of fear. The Rivera court noted, “[t]he United States is not required to
show that the victim did not consent to the sexual act, nor is the prosecution required to show that the
victim resisted.” Id. at 1297. The defense requested two instructions. The first stated, “Consent to
sexual intercourse is a total defense to the charges against Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse and
sexual abuse.” The second stated, “[W]hether consent to intercourse was given rests on whether an
alleged victim of ordinary resolution would not offer resistance or that because of reasonable fear of
harm, a woman of ordinary resolution would not offer resistance.” Id. at 129798. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the trial judge’s decision not to give these special consent instructions concluding, “the
district court instructed the jury to find Rivera guilty only if they concluded he used force or threats
to engage in intercourse with Natasha. If he did not (i.e., Natasha consented), they were to find him
not guilty.” Id. at 1298.
70
United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289, 303 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (“If [evidence of the affirmative
defense of consent] is introduced, the military judge must instruct the members to consider all of the
evidence, including the evidence of consent, when determining whether the government has proven
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). The CAAF reviews allegations of instructional error regarding
affirmative defenses “under a de novo standard of review.” United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 87
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United States v. Bean, 62 M.J. 264, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v.
Forbes, 61 M.J. 354, 357 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). Allegations of error “rais[ing] constitutional
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modification, military case law applicable to rape cases (unlike federal court case
law71) was protective of the accused; essentially, military courts had established a
very minimal evidentiary requirement to obtain a mistake of fact as to consent
instruction, requiring an instruction in any case raising consent as an affirmative
defense. Such an instruction was required even in cases where the defendant
simply testified that consent was unequivocal, or even where the accused did not
testify and the possibility of mistake of fact was raised through cross-examination
of the victim about her failure to aggressively deflect the accused’s advances and
failure to instruct on this defense caused conviction reversals.72 In United States v.
Brown,73 the CAAF admonished any military judge who did not provide a mistake
of fact as to consent instruction stating:
[l]astly, it is hard to believe that . . . [the] Military Judges’ Benchbook . .
. does not have a statement in 2-inch high letters, “INSTRUCT ON
REASONABLE AND HONEST MISTAKE IN ALL RAPE CASES
INVOLVING CONSENT UNLESS THE DEFENSE COUNSEL
AGREES THAT THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED.” . . . Why invite an
appellate issue?74
The 2012 Article 120 turned the focus to the accused’s mental state by adding
known or reasonably should be known,75 making it easier for the accused to defend
his conduct by simply testifying, thus incorporating the mistake of fact as to
consent defense into the offenses themselves. The Massachusetts Supreme Court
warned against this shift stating, “[a] shift in focus from the victim’s to the
defendant’s state of mind might require victims to use physical force in order to
implications, [are] tested for prejudice using a ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.” Id.
(citing United States v. Wolford, 62 M.J. 418, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
71

Martin, 528 F.3d at 753.

72

United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 91 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (stating “[T]he appellate court
below erred to the extent it possibility suggested that and accused must testify in order that a mistakeof-fact instruction be given”); see also United States v. DiPaola, 67 M.J. 98, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2008)
(reversing indecent assault conviction and holding “The evidence to support a mistake of fact
instruction can come from evidence presented by the defense, the prosecution or the court-martial.”
It is not necessary for an accused to testify in order to establish a mistake of fact defense.); United
States v. Tollinchi, 54 M.J. 80, 81–83 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (reversing the jury’s finding of guilty of rape
because of the accused’s mistake of fact as to the recruit’s consent even though the accused did not
testify that sex occurred).
73

43 M.J. 187, 190 (C.A.A.F. 1995).

74

Id. (emphasis in original); see United States v. Gamble, 27 M.J. 298, 308 (C.M.A. 1988)
(determining that even though accused and victim drank alcohol together in his apartment at 1:00 am,
and even though he did not testify that he believed she consented, he was entitled to a mistake of fact
instruction and his conviction was reversed).
75

See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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communicate an unqualified lack of consent to defeat any honest and reasonable
belief as to consent.”76
Since military judges are required by case law to provide an instruction
regarding mistake of fact as to consent, even though some states have decided that
such an instruction is not constitutionally required, military law should include a
provision to limit the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent in sexual
assault cases by including a statutory provision. The 2007 Article 120(t)(15)
which was repealed (without explanation) in 2012 defined the affirmative defense
of mistake of fact as to consent and thus, significantly limited its scope. The 2007
provision provided:
Mistake of fact as to consent. The term “mistake of fact as to consent”
means the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect
belief that the other person engaging in the sexual conduct consented.
The ignorance or mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused
and must have been reasonable under all the circumstances. To be
reasonable, the ignorance or mistake must have been based on
information, or lack of it, that would indicate to a reasonable person that
the other person consented. Additionally, the ignorance or mistake
cannot be based on the negligent failure to discover the true facts.
Negligence is the absence of due care. Due care is what a reasonably
careful person would do under the same or similar circumstances. The
accused’s state of intoxication, if any, at the time of the offense is not
relevant to mistake of fact. A mistaken belief that the other person
consented must be that which a reasonably careful, ordinary, prudent,
sober adult would have had under the circumstances at the time of the
offense. A reasonable mistake of fact may not be found that is based
upon ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of
conduct by the accused that amounts to force, violence, duress, menace,
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of the
alleged victim or another.77
76

Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Mass. 2001).

77
2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (t)(15); see also 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO
JSC, supra note 8, at 10305 (stating that the definition of consent is drawn from statutes and
case law from states including Vermont, Utah, Washington State, Washington, D.C., Illinois, Florida,
California, Colorado, and Minnesota). The last sentence of the definition is added to the 2007 Article
120 statutory definition of mistake of fact to further limit the scope of the mistake of fact defense as
to consent and this sentence is based on 18 CAL. JUR. 3d. § 562 (West 2013) (citing People v.
Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. Ct. App. 992)). Incorporation of California’s case law on the mistake
of fact defense effectively limits the scope of the mistake of fact defense. See People v. Lee, 248
P.3d 651, 668 (Cal. 2011) (quoting JOHN M. DINSE, ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
CRIMINAL §10.65 (West Group, 7th ed. 2005)). In some cases, a physically dominant defendant may
use bodily force or threats, and the victim may become compliant, believing resistance is futile or to
avoid injury. At trial, the defendant may deny making the threat and claim the victim either outright
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The 2007 provision (with the added sentence at the end included above)
should be returned as part of the statutory structure of Article 120. With the
present state of Article 120 and in the absence of a statutory definition for this
affirmative defense, it is unclear how the President may define mistake of fact as to
consent, and whether the CAAF will accept that definition. Eliminating the
“accused state of intoxication” as a factor in this affirmative defense is particularly
problematic.78 Under the 2012 Article 120, the accused has the opportunity to
parlay his alcohol consumption into an acquittal, especially with the statutory focus
on the accused’s state of mind and knowledge at the time of the offense.
The Eighth Circuit recently addressed a controversy involving the necessity of
the prosecution to prove the accused’s knowledge of the victim’s intoxication.79 In
Bruguier, the victim was intoxicated, passed out on the floor of the kitchen, and
had no memory of what happened to her. The defendant said she was awake and
consented to sexual activity with him.80 The Eighth Circuit held the use of
“knowingly” in 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) “requires a defendant to know the victim was
consented or consented by complying with his demands. This provision will eliminate the
application of the mistake of fact defense under these scenarios.
78
Some may conclude that because the 2012 MCM, Rule for Courts-Martial [RCM] 916(j)(3)
(established by executive order) includes the 2007 Article 120(t)(15) definition of mistake of fact,
eliminating the statutory definition of mistake of fact in the UCMJ punitive Article 120 for sexual
assaults is harmless. It is unclear, however, how future MCMs will address this affirmative defense.

Moreover, the President has not yet implemented the 2012 changes to Article 120:
The subparagraphs that would normally address elements, explanation, lesser[-]included
offenses, maximum punishments, and sample specifications are generated under the
President’s authority to prescribe rules pursuant to Article 36. At the time of publishing
this MCM, the President had not prescribed such rules for this version of Article 120.
Practitioners should refer to the appropriate statutory language and, to the extent
practicable, use Appendix 28 as a guide.
2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV at ¶ 45.
Two additional problems are evident from the repeal of Article 120(t)(15) and retention of the
affirmative defense in RCM 916(j)(3): (1) appellate courts may interpret the repeal of 2007 Article
120(t)(15) as Congressional intent that this RCM definition (pursuant to executive order) was flawed;
and (2) the CAAF may conclude that the President lacks authority to define the terms of the mistake
of fact defense because it is substantive law. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining
that very little deference is given to the President’s statements about substantive law in the MCM).
79

United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Rouillard,
701 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2012), vacated and rehearing en banc granted, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15795
(8th Cir. S.D., Mar. 4, 2013).
80
Bruguier, 735 F.3d at 756–57 (“Bruguier testified that [the victim] kept asking him to
dance after he arrived at her house and that they kissed and had consensual sex. He testified that
[she] was conscious, moving, and moaning throughout their sexual encounter and that she never
asked him to stop.”).
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‘incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct’ or ‘physically incapable of
declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that
sexual act,’” and the trial judge committed reversible error when he failed to
instruct the jury accordingly.81 The dissent concludes “that Congress opted to
place the risk of error about incapacity on the sexual aggressor . . . the correct and
most natural grammatical reading of § 2242(2) does not apply any knowledge
requirement to the victim's incapacity . . .”82 The Bruguier dissent noted:
[A]lmost all of the sexual assault cases which have been brought
under § 2242(2) arise from abuse of alcohol or drugs in
situations where intent may be difficult to establish. Concerns
about practical enforceability therefore reinforce the natural
grammatical reading of § 2242(2) that knowledge of incapacity
is not an element of the offense.
The type of case now before us has not allowed the government
easily to convict defendants. In the past ten years, the district
courts in our circuit have conducted twenty-nine trials in which
defendants were charged under § 2242(2) and the jury instructed
that the “knowingly” requirement applied only to the defendant’s
engagement in the sexual act and not to the victim’s incapacity.
Nevertheless, nearly half of the defendants were acquitted of the
charges under § 2242(2) (thirteen out of twenty-nine).83
iii. Initial Burden for the Affirmative Defenses of Mistake of Fact as to
Consent
The 2007 Article 120’s definition of mistake of fact as to consent should be
reinstated in Article 120 to ensure statutory publication of the various internal
limitations on the scope of the mistake of fact as to consent defense. A statutory
definition provides transparency to victims and non-lawyers who cannot assess the
scope of this defense, which is otherwise buried in case law. Moreover, a statutory
definition increases stability since it is less subject to judicial interpretation and
reversal of convictions when a trial judge’s instructions do not comport with an
appellate body’s views. Limiting judicial discretion restricts the defense’s scope
and thus ensures a more victim-oriented defense.
Article 120 should also be amended to restrict this defense’s applicability
since Congress may require the accused’s defense to bear the burden of raising,
establishing, or proving an affirmative defense (subject to due process restrictions
81

Id. at 76061.

82

Id. at 779.

83

Id. at 778.

464

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 11:2

on impermissible presumptions of guilt).84 The CAAF indicated the burdenshifting scheme in the 2007 Article 120(t)(16)85 for applying the consent defense
was confusing and unconstitutional.86 In California, the affirmative defense of
mistake of fact as to consent in sex offenses (known as the Mayberry Defense87) is
based on case law rather than statute.88 California’s Mayberry Defense reflects the
2007 version of Article 120 with two variances, which the military could adopt to
avoid the issues raised regarding the unconstitutional burden shifting.
In California, the defense has the initial burden of showing there is
“substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to
reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”89
“Evidence is . . . [substantial when], if believed by the [trier of fact], [it is]
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt [about the defendant’s guilt].”90 At the same
time, a defendant is only entitled to jury instructions as to a defense “for which
there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.”91
In California, the judge, not the jury, must make a threshold finding that the
evidence with respect to consent is substantial and equivocal.92 If this requirement
is not met, the judge does not provide the jury instruction regarding the affirmative
defense of mistake of fact as to consent. This requirement, in effect, virtually
eliminates the mistake of fact as to consent doctrine in California because
defendants who unequivocally assert the other person consented receive the
consent instruction and not the mistake of fact as to consent instruction.
84

United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289, 298301 (C.A.A.F. 2010).

85

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

86

United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338, 338 (C.A.A.F. 2011).

87

See James v. McDonald, No. 2:11CV022580(JKS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165947, at
*28–*33 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975))
(affirming trial judge’s decision not to instruct on Mayberry Defense).
88

18 CAL. JUR. 3d. § 562 (West 2013).

89

People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 877, 908 (Cal. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing People v.
Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992)). In Williams, the court explained that the defendant must have
“honestly and in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual
intercourse” based upon “evidence of the victim’s equivocal conduct,” and “the defendant’s mistake
regarding consent [must have been] reasonable under the circumstances.” Williams, 841 P.2d at 965.
This mistake of fact instruction “should not be given absent substantial evidence of equivocal
conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed
where it did not.” Id. at 966. See also Athans v. Vasquez, No. CV 052676(RGK), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 77726, at *58 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (denying habeas corpus despite California trial court’s failure
to give requested mistake of fact instruction).
90

People v. Salas, 127 P.3d 40 (Cal. 2006).

91

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).

92

Martinez, 224 P.3d at 908.
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For example, Williams illustrates the application of the California rule. The
trial court held that the mistake of fact as to consent defense was applicable
because Deborah (the alleged victim) stated that she and Williams (the defendant)
went to a hotel room to watch television, and she did not object when Williams
received sheets from the hotel clerk.93 The Supreme Court of California found
otherwise, stating:
Williams testified that Deborah initiated sexual contact, fondled him to
overcome his impotence, and inserted his penis inside herself. This
testimony, if believed, established actual consent. In contrast, Deborah
testified that the sexual encounter occurred only after Williams blocked
her attempt to leave, punched her in the eye, pushed her onto the bed,
and ordered her to take her clothes off, warning her that he did not like to
hurt people. This testimony, if believed, would preclude any reasonable
belief of consent. These wholly divergent accounts create no middle
ground from which Williams could argue he reasonably misinterpreted
Deborah’s conduct.94
The lower court relied on Williams’ statement describing consent and the fact
that the hotel clerk did not describe any screams emanating from the defendant’s
room.95 On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed the lower court,
affirmed Williams’s conviction, and held “there was no substantial evidence of
equivocal conduct warranting an instruction on reasonable and good faith mistake
of fact as to consent to sexual intercourse in this case.”96
The California rule limiting the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to
consent has been in effect more than twenty years97 and California trial judges
have successfully applied it in numerous sexual assault cases. The affirmative
defense of mistake of fact as to consent requires structure within Article 120. To
ensure a statutory framework, “mistake of fact as to consent” from the 2007 Article
120(t)(16) should be returned to Article 120 as subsection (g) (Definitions) section

93

Williams, 841 P.2d at 966–67.

94

Id. at 966.

95

Id. at 966–67.

96
Id. at 967. The California Supreme Court also recommended that “[t]he jury should,
however, be further instructed, if appropriate, that a reasonable mistake of fact may not be found if
the jury finds that such equivocal conduct on the part of the victim was the product of ‘force,
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.’”
Id. at 968.
97

Id. at 961.
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(9), 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(9) (as discussed above) and the following provisions
should be added to Article 120(f) (Defenses)98 as subsection (1):
Affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent.
The term “affirmative defense” means any special defense that, although
not denying that the accused committed the objective acts constituting
the offense charged, denies, wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility
for those acts. The military judge shall not instruct the members that
there is a defense of mistake of fact as to consent: (1) if the defense
evidence is unequivocal consent and the prosecution’s evidence is of
non-consensual forcible sex; or (2) unless substantial evidence has been
presented on the merits99 that the mistake of fact affirmative defense, as
defined in section Article 120(g)(9), 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(9)100 applies.
C. Impact of Military Law Regarding Lesser-Included Offenses
Issues regarding lesser-included offenses in turn impact charging decisions,
unreasonable multiplication of charges and multiplicity challenges, and jury
instruction choices. These issues cause confusion in criminal trials generally; the
same is true in the case of Article 120 sexual assault cases in the military justice
system.101 For example, multiple sex acts during one episode may be charged
separately.102 When available lesser-included offenses decrease, the government
may charge more offenses by dividing a single event into different offenses,
protecting against the exigencies of proof.103 Essentially, “[a]ll American
98
2012 Article 120, supra note 15, at section (f) states, “(f) Defenses.—An accused may raise
any applicable defenses available under this chapter or the Rules for Court-Martial. Marriage is not a
defense for any conduct in issue in any prosecution under this section.”
99

The military judge should wait until after all of the evidence is presented on the merits
before deciding whether a mistake of fact as to consent instruction is warranted. See supra notes 69
& 70.
100

The proposed definition of mistake of fact as to consent in the new Article 120(g)(9) is the
same as in the 2007 Article 120(t)(16). See supra note 55.
101

Lesser-included offenses and multiplicity have been described as creating “‘chaos’ and
[being the] ‘Sargasso Sea’ of military and federal law” and “a vortex that sucks in all sorts of debris .
. . and causes great suffering.” Captain Gary E. Felicetti, Surviving the Multiplicity/LIO Family
Vortex, 2011 ARMY LAW. 46 (Feb. 2011) (tracing the morass of multiplicity and lesser-included
offenses in military law). “No area of law relating to jury instructions has created more confusion
than that governing when a court may or must put before the jury for its decision a lesser-included
offense.” WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.8(d) (2d ed. 1984).
102

See United States v. Plenty Chief, 561 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (separate specifications
charging touching breasts and attempted digital penetration may be charged); United States v. Two
Elk, 536 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding separately charged aggravated sexual abuse specifications
of anal and vaginal penetration during the same incident are not multiplicious).
103

Felicetti, supra note 101, at 51.
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jurisdictions recognize lesser-included offenses as a device that permits a jury to
acquit a defendant of a charged offense and instead to convict of a less serious
crime that is necessarily committed during the commission of the charged
offense.”104 The confusion occurs first when determining what offenses to charge
to capture all criminal conduct and which lesser offenses fall under the charged
offense, and then providing appropriate jury instructions.105 Three tests exist to
determine what lesser-included offenses fall under the charged offense: the
statutory elements test, the evidentiary approach, and the cognate-pleading test.106
Determining what lesser-included offenses fall within a charged offense
became clearer for the Armed Forces when in 2010, in United States v. Jones, the
CAAF mandated that military courts use the elements test that other federal courts
use, stating that:
[u]nder the elements test, one compares the elements of each offense. If
all of the elements of offense X are also elements of offense Y, then X is
an [lesser-included offense] LIO of Y. Offense Y is called the greater
offense because it contains all of the elements of offense X along with
the one or more additional elements.107
104
Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
351, 354 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
105
Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Future of Constitutionally Required Lesser Included Offenses,
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 588 (2006).
106
State v. Keller, 695 N.W.2d 703, 707 (N.D. 2005) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.8(e) (2d ed. 1984)) (listing the three tests and stating:

AL.,

5

Under the “statutory elements” approach, the elements of the offense must be such that it is
impossible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser. “The statutoryelements approach, which was the original common law position, is used today in the federal
courts and in a growing number of states.” Under the “evidentiary” approach, the instruction
would be appropriate if the facts of the case would permit an accused to be convicted of a less
serious offense even if the elements do not make it impossible to commit the greater without
committing the lesser offense. The “cognate pleadings” approach looks to the pleadings rather
than to the evidence introduced. The evidentiary and cognate-pleadings approaches have been
criticized as being unclear and placing both the prosecutor and defense in an untenable
position, because they open the door for so many potential lesser-included offenses.) (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). In the “inherent[-]relationship” test, “the greater and
lesser offenses “must relate to protection of the same interests, and must be so related that in
the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense
is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the greater offense.”
United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 744 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). In Horn, the Tenth
Circuit abandoned the “inherent[-]relationship test” and returned to “elements test” also known as
“the impossibility test” because if the elements of a lesser offense must be a subset of the greater
offense, then it is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser.
Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Brown, 604 F.2d 557, 560–61 (8th Cir. 1979)).
107

United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 470 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
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In mandating the elements test, the CAAF merely followed the Supreme
Court’s direction.108 Further establishing the elements test, the court in United
States v. Fosler reversed a conviction for adultery and reinforced the constitutional
requirement for notice pleading, stating:
This test [the elements test] requires that “the indictment contain[] the
elements of both offenses and thereby give[] notice to the defendant that
he may be convicted on either charge.”. . . The military is a notice
pleading jurisdiction. A charge and specification will be found sufficient
if they, “first, contain[] the elements of the offense” charged and fairly
inform[] a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and,
second, enable[] him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future
prosecutions for the same offense.” The rules governing court-martial
procedure encompass the notice requirement: “A specification is
sufficient if it alleges every element of the charged offense expressly or
by necessary implication.”109
As for instructions, the CAAF determined that pursuant to the elements test,
“the elements of the lesser-offense are a subset of the elements of the charged
offense. Where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater
offense, no instruction [regarding a lesser included offense] is to be given.”110 The
CAAF agreed that a lesser-included offense must be included in the greater offense
stating:
The basic test to determine whether the court-martial may properly find
the accused guilty of an offense other than that charged is whether the
specification of the offense on which the accused was arraigned alleges
fairly, and the proof raises reasonably, all elements of both crimes so that
they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses.111
The presence of Article 120 definitions makes it easier to delineate lesserincluded offenses and to identify the accused’s acts that must be proven to

108

United States v. Bonner, 70 M.J. 1, 2 (citing Jones, 68 M.J. at 472); Schmuck v. U.S., 489
U.S. 705, 716 (1989).
109

United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225, 22829 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citations omitted).

110

Bonner, 70 M.J. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alston,
69 M.J. 214 (C.A.A.F. 2010) and Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716).
111

Jones, 68 M.J. at 469 (quoting United States v. Virgilito, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 394, 395–96, 47
C.M.R. 331, 332–33 (1973)).
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establish guilt.112 The elements test, as applied to Article 120, may, however,
cause cautious military prosecutors (trial counsel) to charge multiple sex offenses
to increase the probability of a conviction. Multiple sex offense charges may
mislead or confuse panel members who will see the multiple charges on the flyer
(a document provided to the military jury at the start of the court-martial).
Additionally, the CAAF requires instructions on all lesser-included offenses if
evidence is presented to support the lesser-included offense. The court has
concluded:
When evidence is adduced during the trial which “reasonably raises”. . .
a lesser-included offense, the judge must instruct the court panel
regarding . . . [the] lesser-included offense . . . . [T]his Court [has] held
that [i]nstructions on lesser-included offenses are required unless
affirmatively waived by the defense . . . As the defense did not
affirmatively waive an instruction on [the lesser-included offense] in this
case, the military judge was required to instruct on the lesser-included
offense . . . if the evidence reasonably raised it.113
112

Bonner, 70 M.J. at 3 (assault consummated by a battery is a lesser-included offense of
wrongful sexual contact); United States v. Wilkins, 71 M.J. 410, 412 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (affirming
conviction of lesser-included offense “[b]ecause abusive sexual contact piggybacks the definition of
aggravated sexual assault, all of the elements of the two offenses necessarily line up, except that
aggravated sexual assault requires a ‘sexual act’ whereas abusive sexual contact requires ‘sexual
contact’”); Alston, 69 M.J. at 21516 (affirming aggravated sexual assault conviction as a lesserincluded offense of a rape). The difficulties with charging lesser-included offenses involving sex
offenses preceded the reform of 2007 Article 120. See Jones, 68 M.J. at 473 (reversing conviction of
indecent acts with another, holding indecent acts with another is not a lesser-included offense of the
pre-2007 Article 120 version of rape); United States v. Burleson, 69 M.J. 165 (C.A.A.F. 2010)
(same).
113
United States v. Davis, 53 M.J. 202, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted) (fourth alteration in original); United States v. Wells, 52 M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.F.
1999) (citations omitted) (“Military law goes further [than federal civilian law]. It requires a trial
judge to give such an instruction on a lesser[-]included offense ‘sua sponte . . . for which there is . . .
some evidence which reasonably places the lesser[-]included offense in issue.’”). Appellate litigation
in the past several years has focused on problematic lesser-included sex offenses charged as Article
134 offenses, offenses prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting conduct. Until
recently, courts-martial practice permitted instructions to the fact finder on lesser-included offenses
such as indecent assault and indecent acts (Article 134), when rape (Article 120), or forcible sodomy
(Article 125) was charged. See United States v. Schoolfield, 40 M.J. 132, 137 (C.M.A. 1994)
(“[A]lthough indecent acts requires a service disorder or discrediting circumstances, such an element
is included by implication in Article 120.”); United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 143 (C.M.A. 1994),
overruled in part by United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 38889 (C.A.A.F. 2009). In 2010, the
CAAF reversed an accused’s conviction of indecent acts, holding that indecent acts (an Article 134
offense) was not a lesser-included offense of rape (an Article 120 offense). Jones, 68 M.J. at 473. In
United States v. Fosler, the court held that the terminal element of prejudice to good order and
discipline or service discrediting conduct in adultery in violation of Article 134 was not necessarily
implied in the specification and would not survive a motion to dismiss. 70 M.J. at 22932.
Additionally, an allegation in the specification that accused “wrongfully” engaged in adulterous
conduct did not imply the terminal element. Id. The CAAF further changed the rules on charging
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Traditionally, the CAAF employed “a liberal standard in determining whether
an offense is lesser included in one that is charged.”114 This broad interpretation
urged military trial judges to give defense counsel great leeway and liberally grant
requests for instructions on lesser-included offenses.
With the CAAF’s declaration of the elements test and required notice
pleading—providing the accused with adequate notice as the offenses charged115—
coupled with the revamped Article 120, trial counsel found themselves charging
additional offenses that have different elements.116 In response to concerns that
lesser-included offenses relating to charging decisions and panel instructions were
causing confusion after the 2006 revision of Article 120, the DoD ordered a review
and sought suggestions about the charging of sex offenses.117 Some military

Article 134 offenses in United States v. Humphries, holding, “that the accused was prejudiced by the
failure to allege the terminal element in a contested Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006),
specification.” Wilkins, 71 M.J. at 414 n.4 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing United States v. Humphries, 71
M.J. 209, 217 (C.A.A.F. 2012)).
114

United States v. McVey, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 167, 175, 15 C.M.R. 167, 175 (1954) (Brosman, J.,
concurring) (“Traditionally this Court has worn an outsize pair of spectacles in viewing the problem
of lesser included offenses, and has applied an extremely generous standard in determining whether a
related offense is included within the principal one. I am sure of the overall soundness of this
policy.”).
115

Fosler, 70 M.J. at 22829.
Jones, 68 M.J. at 465; United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 27 (C.A.A.F. 2008); Miller, 67
M.J. at 385; Fosler, 70 M.J. at 225.
117
REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY SERVICES
8081 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter DTFSAMS REPORT 2009]. Subsequently, on October 23, 2012, the
DoD proposed amending the Manual for Courts-Martial to clarify when an offense is a lesserincluded offense, citing United States v. Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012); Fosler, 70 M.J. at 225;
and Jones, 68 M.J. at 465 to explain the necessity of this change. Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 205,
October 23, 2012, p. 64885–86. The proposed Manual change reads:
(b) Paragraph 3b, Article 79, Lesser[-]Included Offenses, is amended to read as follows:
116

b. Explanation.
(1) In general. A lesser offense is “necessarily included” in a charged offense when the
elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense, thereby
putting the accused on notice to defend against the lesser offense in addition to the
offense specifically charged. A lesser offense may be “necessarily included” when:
(a) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and the
common elements are identical (for example, larceny as a lesser included offense of
robbery);
(b) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, but one
or more elements is a subset by being legally less serious (for example, housebreaking as
a lesser included offense of burglary); or
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prosecutors indicated that the charging of multiple offenses on the charge sheet and
complex, lengthy jury instructions confused panel members and might be resulting
in acquittals.118
Since the Article 120 offenses were primarily modeled after Title 18 sex
offenses,119 one might expect that the same problems would have surfaced through
the years of prosecuting hundreds of Title 18 sexual assault offenses;120 however,
there is no evidence that Assistant U.S. Attorneys have blamed unsuccessful
prosecutions on confusing jury instructions or multiple charges. Military courtsmartial practice regarding charging and instructions as they relate to lesserincluded offenses is now more consistent with practice in U.S. district courts.121
Federal courts have imposed a more restrictive method of evaluating lesserincluded offense instructions by generally applying the five-factor test which
entitles a defendant to a lesser-included offense instruction when:
(1) a proper request is made; (2) the lesser-offense elements are identical
to part of the greater-offense elements; (3) some evidence would justify
conviction of the lesser offense; (4) there is evidence such that the jury

(c) All of the elements of the lesser offense are “included and necessary” parts of the
greater offense, but the mental element is a subset by being legally less serious (for
example, wrongful appropriation as a lesser included offense of larceny).
(2) Sua sponte duty. A military judge must instruct panel members on lesser included
offenses reasonably raised by the evidence.
(3) Multiple lesser included offenses. When the offense charged is a compound offense
comprising two or more included offenses, an accused may be found guilty of any or all
of the offenses included in the offense charged. For example, robbery includes both
larceny and assault. Therefore, in a proper case, a court-martial may find an accused not
guilty of robbery, but guilty of wrongful appropriation and assault.
(4) Findings of guilty to a lesser[-]included offense. A court-martial may find an accused
not guilty of the offense charged, but guilty of a lesser[-]included offense by the process
of exception and substitution. The court-martial may except (that is, delete) the words in
the specification that pertain to the offense charged and, if necessary, substitute language
appropriate to the lesser[-]included offense.
Id. at 64856–57.
118
See 2010 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, supra note 12; see also, Jane A. Minerly, The
Interplay of Double Jeopardy, the Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses, and the Substantive Crimes
of Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1103, 110304 (2009).
119
See United States v. Booker, 72 M.J. 787, 805 (N.M.C.C.A. 2013) (citations omitted).
120
The regime of Title 18 sexual abuse offenses has been in effect for twenty-seven years. 18
U.S.C. § 2241–45 were added November 10, 1986, by P.L. 99-646, § 87(b), 100 Stat. 3620.
121
United States v. Bonner, 70 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding that assault consummated
by a battery is a lesser-included offense of wrongful sexual contact); United States v. Alston, 69 M.J.
214, 21516 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (holding that aggravated sexual assault is a lesser-included offense of
rape by force).
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may find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesserincluded-offense; and (5) mutuality.”122
To provide further structure and restrictions for courts, Congress should
legislatively import this five-factor test into the military justice system,
establishing greater consistency and predictability.
Such action may be
accomplished by the legislation proposed and attached to this article as an
appendix.
IV. GOOD MILITARY CHARACTER EVIDENCE: CHANGING THE MILITARY RULES
OF EVIDENCE TO BETTER PROTECT VICTIMS
In addition to statutory changes to the sexual assault punitive articles, some
limits should be made to the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s good
military character during courts-martial for sexual assault offenses. Although
President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law in
December 2013123 and that law includes a provision reducing the influence the
122
United States v. Meeks, 639 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v.
Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 40001 (8th Cir.
1994); see also David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety of Lesser-Included-Offense Charge to Jury
in Federal Criminal Case—General Principles, 100 A.L.R. FED. 481, 49596 (Westlaw 2011)
(stating federal courts either use the Meeks five-factor test or a four-factor test, eliminating the
mutuality test and listing numerous cases applying these tests); United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d
434, 43940 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying four-factor test).
123
The House Armed Services Committee summarized the sexual assault prevention
provisions in the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] as follows:

The legislation includes over 30 provisions or reforms to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice related to combatting sexual assault in the military. These reforms would strip
commanders of their authority to dismiss a finding by a court-martial—a power they have
held since the earliest days of our military. It would also prohibit commanders from
reducing guilty findings to guilty of a lesser offense. Where servicemembers are found
guilty of sexual assault related offenses the NDAA establishes minimum sentencing
guidelines. Currently, such guidelines only exist in the military for the crimes of murder
and espionage. Personnel records will now include information on sex-related offenses.
Recognizing that victim support is as vital as prosecution, the NDAA would allow
victims of sexual assault to apply for a permanent change of station or unit transfer, while
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to inform commanders of their authority to remove
or temporarily reassign servicemembers who are the alleged perpetrators of sexual
assault. The NDAA requires the provision of victims’ counsel, qualified and specially
trained lawyers in each of the services, to be made available to provide legal assistance to
the victims of sex-related offenses. The NDAA adds rape, sexual assault, or other sexual
misconduct to the protected communications of servicemembers, with a Member of
Congress or an Inspector General—and expands those protections for sexual assault
crimes. The NDAA eliminates the 5 year statute of limitations on rape and sexual assault.
To better protect victims’ rights, the NDAA reforms the Article 32 process to avoid
destructive fishing expeditions and properly focus on probable cause. A number of
victims’ rights policies are enshrined in statute. Finally, to ensure that the military is
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accused’s character and military service has on the commander’s disposition
decision,124 that provision will not eliminate the impact of such evidence in the
courtroom.
Comparing admissibility of good character evidence in federal court with
military courts-martial illustrates how broad admissibility under the Mil. R. Evid.
may also lead to acquittals and, in turn, negatively impact victims. Some
modification should be made to these rules to ensure admission of good military
character evidence is prohibited in cases of violence or sexual activity, unless the
character trait corresponds to an element of the offense charged.
A. Do the Military Rules of Evidence Provide More Leeway: A Comparison of the
Federal and Military Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence [Fed. R. Evid.] 404(a) and Mil. R. Evid. 404(a)
providing for the admissibility of good character evidence are similar but not
identical. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) provides as follows:
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
(a) Character Evidence.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a person’s character or character trait
is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted
in accordance with the character or trait.
(2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case. The
following exceptions apply in a criminal case:
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant’s pertinent trait,
and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to
rebut it . . . .
Similarly, Mil. R. Evid. 404(a) provides:
better positioned to deal with the crisis of sexual assault within its ranks, the NDAA
requires the Secretary of Defense to assess the current role and authorities of
commanders in the administration of military justice and the investigation, prosecution,
and adjudication of offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
H. ARMED SERVICES COMM., 113TH CONG. FACT SHEET: FY14 NDAA SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=127E1D4B-DD70-4B69-80DCA036DA7B3519. The DoD has a variety of ongoing studies, panels, and initiatives designed to
improve treatment of victims and increase the effectiveness of training and disposition of sex assault
offenses. See Schenck, supra note 16, at 592–96, 646–47, 651, 657.
OF THE

124
NDAA, section 1708 states, “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the discussion pertaining to Rule 306 of the Manual for Courts-Martial (relating to policy on
initial disposition of offenses) shall be amended to strike the character and military service of the
accused from the matters a commander should consider in deciding how to dispose of an offense.”
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct;
exceptions; other crimes
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s character or a
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of the accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if
evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the
crime is offered by an accused and admitted under Mil. R. Evid.
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character, if relevant, of the
accused offered by the prosecution.
An additional rule of evidence allowing for the admissibility of good
character evidence in criminal trials is Rule 405. Here, the distinction between the
military rule and the federal rule is important and results in facilitating the
accused’s presentation of specific records reflecting good military character. Fed.
R. Evid. 405 provides as follows:
Rule 405. Methods of Proving Character
(a) By Reputation or Opinion. When evidence of a person’s character or
character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the
person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On crossexamination of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into
relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct.
(b) By Specific Instances of Conduct. When a person’s character or
character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the
character or trait may also be proved by relevant specific instances of the
person’s conduct.
The first few military and federal 405 provisions seem equivalent, both
allowing evidence of specific instances in certain cases. The provision regarding
admissibility of affidavits or other written statements in the military rules,
however, further opens the door to good military character evidence. Mil. R. Evid.
405 provides:
Rule 405. Methods of proving character
(a) Reputation or opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by

2014

SEX OFFENSES UNDER MILITARY LAW

475

testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is an essential element of an offense or defense,
proof may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct.
(c) Affidavits. The defense may introduce affidavits or other written
statements of persons other than the accused concerning the character of
the accused. If the defense introduces affidavits or other written
statements under this subdivision, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, also
introduce affidavits or other written statements regarding the character of
the accused. Evidence of this type may be introduced by the defense or
prosecution only if, aside from being contained in an affidavit or other
written statement, it would otherwise be admissible under these rules.
(d) Definitions. “Reputation” means the estimation in which a person
generally is held in the community in which the person lives or pursues a
business or profession. “Community” in the armed forces includes a
post, camp, ship, station, or other military organization regardless of size.
B. Good Character Evidence in U.S. District Courts
If charged with committing a violent crime, the defendant may present
specific instances of conduct as proof that the defendant possesses a relevant
character trait such as “peaceableness.”125 In addition, in federal district courts, a
defendant has the right to establish the character trait of being a law-abiding citizen
in every case, not only where the defendant testifies or when dishonesty is an
element of crime.126 Specifically, U.S. District Courts permit reputation and
opinion testimony regarding law-abiding character because it is almost always a
pertinent character trait whenever someone is charged with a crime.127 For
example, in United States v. Darland, a case involving a robbery charge, the judge
erred by excluding evidence of the defendant’s reputation for honesty and integrity
125

United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1190 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Unlike character witnesses,
who must restrict their direct testimony to appraisals of the defendant's reputation, a defendantwitness may cite specific instances of conduct as proof that he possesses a relevant character trait
such as peaceableness.”).
126

United States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1981).

127
See United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 44748 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also United States
v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380, 381 (1st Cir. 1982) (reversed because evidence of law-abiding character
not admitted in case where the defendant was charged with possessing with intent to distribute and
distributing methaqualone).
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as a law-abiding citizen, and for peacefulness whether or not the defendant
testified.128 However, specific instances of law-abiding character are generally
excluded. For example, in United States v. Crockett, the defendant, a former
police officer, could not prove a character trait with evidence of specific instances
of good conduct, but character witnesses could testify under Fed. R. Evid.
404(a)(1), 405(a) as to their opinions that the defendant was a good person and that
they were not aware that he engaged in any illegal activities.129
Federal courts further exclude evidence of a defendant’s prior good acts in
criminal prosecutions as character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 405 when
character is not an essential element of the particular offenses charged.130 For
example, in United States v. Nazzaro, the court found that the trial judge properly
excluded the defendant’s (a police officer’s) resume and other anecdotal proof of
commendations or character evidence as they were not pertinent to the crime of
stealing civil service exams.131 Federal courts have found evidence of a
defendant’s specific traits of honesty, integrity, truthfulness, and generosity are
inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 405(b) because those traits were not essential
elements of charges against defendants or any defenses they raised. Moreover,
character traits raised by defendants were general character traits, and because they
were not “essential elements” of crimes or defenses, courts have found that Rule
405(b) does not permit criminal defendants to admit evidence of specific instances
of those traits.132
Federal courts may also rely on the Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing test to
exclude character evidence. For example, in United States v. Harris, although the
defendant’s mother, girlfriend, and coworker testified that the defendant was a
good father with a reputation for truthfulness, and those character traits were
pertinent in a drug distribution trial under Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), such evidence

128
United States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235, 123738 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v.
Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant need not testify to make truthfulness a
pertinent character trait).
129

United States v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008).

130

United States v. Marlinga, 457 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2006).

131

United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1168 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding character for
“bravery” and “attention to duty” not pertinent to the charges of mail-fraud conspiracy and perjury);
see also United States v. Hill, 40 F.3d 164, 169 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “law-abidingness” not a
“pertinent character trait” related to charges of cashing a stolen government check); see also United
States v. Santana-Camacho, 931 F.2d 966, 96768 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding evidence of character as
“a good family man” and as “a kind person” are inadmissible because it was not pertinent to the
illegal transportation of aliens into the country).
132

See United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 25960 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
White, 737 F.3d 1121, 1137 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 353 n.23 (7th
Cir. 1990); United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1992).
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was properly excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403.133
Nevertheless, federal appellate courts review trial court rulings on
admissibility of opinion and reputation evidence testimony using an “abuse of
discretion” standard, and reversals are very rare. As the D.C. Circuit Court stated
in Harris, whether reputation testimony should be admissible is best determined at
the trial level because
Both propriety and abuse of . . . reputation testimony . . . depend on
numerous and subtle considerations difficult to detect or appraise from a
cold record, and therefore rarely and only upon clear showing of
prejudicial abuse of discretion will Courts of Appeals disturb rulings of
trial courts on this subject.134
In United States v. Davis, the court found that excluding a defendant’s prison
records was not an abuse of discretion because “[r]arely and only after clear
showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will appellate courts disturb rulings of
trial courts admitting [or deciding not to admit] character evidence.”135
C. Good Character Evidence in Courts-Martial
Similar to federal district courts, military trial judges at courts-martial allow
admission of an accused’s reputation as a law-abiding citizen to show the
probability of innocence; moreover, since 1951, military courts have admitted
evidence of an accused’s good military character including military record and
general character as a moral, well-behaved person.136 The accused, “[h]owever,
133

United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 44748 (D.C. Cir. 2007).

134

Id. at 447.

135
United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted). Additionally,
the failure to provide a requested instruction on character evidence may be reversible error. United
States v. John, 309 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 2002).
136

The Manual for Courts-Martial, ¶ 138f(2) provided:

In order to show the probability of his innocence, the accused may introduce evidence of
his own good character, including evidence of his military record and standing and
evidence of his general character as a moral well-conducted person and law-abiding
citizen. However, if the accused desires to introduce evidence as to some specific trait of
character, such evidence must have reasonable tendency to show that it was unlikely that
he committed the particular offense charged. For example, evidence of reputation for
peacefulness would be admissible in a prosecution for any offense involving violence,
but it would be inadmissible in a prosecution for a non-violent theft.
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, ¶ 138f(2) (1951); see also MANUAL
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, ¶ 138f(2) (1969 Rev. Ed.).
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[]may not introduce evidence as to some specific trait of character unless proof of
that trait would have a reasonable tendency to show that it was unlikely that he
committed the particular offense charged.”137
Although no universally accepted definition of “good military character”
exists, military courts broadly interpret this term to include overall military
performance as well as evaluations. Opinions regarding past or future combat
performance are often admitted into evidence, and it is not unusual for a character
witness to testify, I “would want to go to war with him [or her],” or I “would trust
him [or her to have my back] on the battlefield.”138 Dependability, leadership,
initiative, duty performance, proficiency, promptness, and “take charge and
accomplish the mission” attitude, are all relevant attributes of a good soldier.139
Military courts further admit performance evaluation reports as evidence of
good military character.
Evaluations include traits such as professional
performance, military behavior, leadership, supervisory ability, military
appearance, and adaptability, as well as descriptions of assigned tasks and
performance.140 Moreover, military trial judges commit judicial error if they do
not admit enlisted evaluation reports as part of the good soldier defense.141 The
evaluation forms themselves provide definitions such as: professional performance
as “skill and efficiency in performing assigned duties;”142 military behavior as
“[h]ow well the member accepts authority and conforms to the standards of
military behavior”143 and “[l]eadership and supervisory ability” as “the ability to
plan and assign work to others.”144 Military appearance is defined as the
“[m]ember’s military appearance and neatness in person and dress.”145
There are no recent judicial opinions in which the Service Courts of Criminal
Appeals or the CAAF held that a military trial judge properly excluded general
good military character evidence; regardless of the offense charged, the CAAF
(and its predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals) in the past described the
137

United States v. Vandelinder, 20 M.J. 41, 44 (C.M.A. 1985).
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Randall D. Katz and Lawrence D. Sloan, In Defense of the Good Soldier Defense, 170 MIL.
L. REV. 117, 131 (2001) (citations omitted).
139

Id. at 132 (citing United States v. Hallum, 31 M.J. 254, 255 (C.M.A. 1990)); see also
United States v. Brown, 41 M.J. 1, 7 (C.M.A. 1994) (Crawford, J., dissenting); United States v. True,
41 M.J. 424, 427 (1995); United States v. White, 36 M.J. 306, 307 (C.M.A. 1993).
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Vandelinder, 20 M.J. at 43.
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Id. at 4243, 47 (failure to admit reports was harmless error in drug distribution case
beyond a reasonable doubt).
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Id. at 48.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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failure to admit the evidence as an abuse of discretion and then analyzed for
prejudice. Historically, the CAAF evaluated cases for prejudice by employing the
following four-part test for prejudice:
First: Is the [g]overnment’s case against the accused strong and
conclusive?146
Second: Is the defense’s theory of the case feeble or implausible?147
Third: What is the materiality of the proffered testimony? Is the question
whether or not the accused was the type of person who would engage in
the alleged criminal conduct fairly raised by the [g]overnment’s theory of
the case or by the defense?148
Fourth: What is the quality of the proffered defense evidence and is there
any substitute for it in the record of trial?149
Presentation of good military character evidence—also known as the “good
soldier defense”150—may shift the panel’s (i.e., military jury’s) attention from the
criminal offense to the stellar military record of the accused. If evidence of good
military character is presented, the accused is entitled to an instruction regarding
good military character,151 further shifting the trial focus and highlighting the
improbability of guilt. As the Court of Military Appeals noted, “[t]he wellrecognized rationale for admission of evidence of good military character is that it
would provide the basis for an inference that an accused was too professional a
soldier to have committed offenses which would have adverse military
consequences.”152 Critics of the DoD’s approach to processing military sexual
assault cases point to the impact of the good soldier defense on military courtsmartial. While evidence of good military character may be relevant in cases
involving inherently military offenses such as failure to obey a lawful order and
dereliction of duty (Article 92, UCMJ), critics argue that such evidence clouds the
146
United States v. Weeks, 20 M.J. 22, 25 (C.M.A. 1985) (citing United States v. Lewis, 482
F.2d 632, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (citations omitted).
147

Weeks, 20 M.J. at 25 (citing Lewis, 482 F.2d at 646).

148

Weeks, 20 M.J. at 25 (Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948)).
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Weeks, 20 M.J. at 25.

150
See GREGORY MAGGS & LISA SCHENCK, MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES
MATERIALS 596 (2012).
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United States v. Smith, 34 M.J. 341, 342 (C.M.A. 1992) (citing United States v. PujanaMena, 949 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1991)).
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United States v. Wilson, 28 M.J. 48, 49 n.1 (C.M.A. 1989) (citations omitted).
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issue of guilt.153 Some support for this assertion exists. For example in 1998,
Sergeant Major of the Army [SMA] Gene McKinney was charged with nineteen
specifications of sexual abuse or harassment of six female military subordinates
(including a captain and a sergeant major) and obstruction of justice. The jury of
at least one-third enlisted members convicted him of one specification of
obstruction of justice (he was tape recorded trying to convince one of the victims
not to make a statement against him) and reduced his military rank to master
sergeant. Several general officers (including a retired four-star general) and an
assistant secretary of the Army testified regarding SMA McKinney’s good military
character. The highest ranking person who testified on behalf of the female
victims was a lieutenant colonel. Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney’s
lawyers stated that his good military character evidence was important and perhaps
153

Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, The “Good Soldier” Defense: Character Evidence and Military
Rank at Courts-Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879 (1999). Professor Hillman persuasively argues that good
military character evidence is most relevant when the accused is charged with military offenses,
stating:
Courts-martial for offenses defined as “military” present the strongest case for admitting
evidence of good military character. Because military law penalizes many acts that are
not criminal under civilian law, some of the offenses charged at court-martial cannot be
committed by civilians. The good soldier defense is most effective at courts-martial for
these military offenses, particularly for relatively minor charges, such as “conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” abuse of authority, disobedience, and being
absent without leave. In short, good military character, presuming that it indicates at
least something about an accused’s dedication to the military and duty performance, is
most probative in courts-martial for military offenses.
Admitting generic good military character evidence in courts-martial for military-specific
offenses seems consistent with the intent and meaning of Military Rule of Evidence
404(a)(1); surely “military character” is a pertinent trait when a servicemember is
accused of being disrespectful, disloyal, sloppy, or otherwise unsoldierly. Determining
what constitutes a “military” as opposed to a “non-military” offense, however, may call
for a nuanced analysis and careful weighing of multiple factors. Faced with the difficulty
of making a rule to distinguish “service-connected” from “non-service-connected”
offenses, the Supreme Court opted to expand court-martial jurisdiction instead. In the
context of sex crimes and sexual harassment, a line between a military and a nonmilitary
offense is especially difficult to draw, since an accused often has abused his position of
authority in order to commit an offense not specific to the military. In any case, the
practice of restricting good soldier testimony to courts-martial involving military offenses
was abandoned soon after the adoption of the Military Rules of Evidence, when military
courts eliminated the requirement for a “nexus” between military duty and the charged
offense.
Id. at 900–01 (footnotes omitted).
Professor Hillman contends that a military accused should be treated the same as a defendant in
other civilian trials and that such evidence should be inadmissible in prosecutions for drug offenses or
sex crimes. Id. Professor Hillman cites ten appellate decisions describing sex offenses in which the
good soldier character evidence played a role. Id. at 902903, 902 n.121; see also Wilson, 28 M.J.
48, 49 n.1.
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decisive in the acquittal.154 To avoid the possibility of jury nullification based on
the good soldier defense in military sexual assault cases, some change—either
through Congressional direction to the DoD or by statute—is warranted.
D. Recommendation: Amend the Manual for Courts-Martial or Enact a New
Statute
To change the Military Rules of Evidence, the Congress could direct the
executive branch to amend Mil. R. Evid. 404 and 405, by including the following
provision in the NDAA:
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
Military Rule of Evidence 404 shall be modified to clarify that military
character evidence is not admissible to show the probability of innocence
for any violation of: Articles 118 to 132; Articles 77 to 82 involving
predicate offenses under Articles 118 to 132; and Articles 133 and 134
offenses involving violence or sexual misconduct. However, evidence of
other specific traits of an accused’s character, including law-abiding
character, may be offered in evidence when those specific traits are
relevant to an element of an offense for which the accused is being tried.
Military Rule of Evidence 405(c) shall be deleted to make Military Rule
of Evidence 405 more consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 405.
General military character includes but is not limited to past or future
combat performance, dependability, leadership, initiative, duty
performance, proficiency, military bearing, and promptness. Evidence of
law-abiding character shall be admissible to the same extent as under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
Since some risk exists that the executive branch may misinterpret
Congressional intent, the Congress could enact a statutory change to the UCMJ.155
Congress would maintain more control by providing specific language such as the
following:
§ 850b. art. 50b. Admissibility of character evidence
In any case, not capital, involving a violation of Articles 118 to 132;
Articles 77 to 82 involving predicate offenses under Articles 118 to 132;
154
155

Hillman, supra note 153, at 907.

See supra note 5 for a discussion of the pending legislation, the Victims Protection Act of
2014, which includes a provision to limit good character evidence in all cases.
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and Articles 133 and 134 offenses involving violence or sexual
misconduct, evidence of military character is not admissible to show
probability of innocence. Affidavits or other written statements of
persons other than the accused, concerning the character of the accused
or of any other witness, and evidence of law-abiding character shall be
admissible to the same extent as under Federal Rule of Evidence 405.
General military character includes but is not limited to past or future
battlefield performance, dependability, leadership, initiative, duty
performance, proficiency, military bearing, and promptness. Evidence of
law-abiding character shall be admissible to the same extent as under
Federal Rule of Evidence 404.
V. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDED STATUTORY CHANGES TO PROTECT VICTIMS
In response to the pressure President Barack Obama, Congress, the media,
and the American public have placed on the DoD to reform its approach to sexual
assault in the military services, the DoD has conducted multiple reviews and
launched several investigations into the issue while Congress has implemented
statutory changes to the UCMJ in 2007 and 2012. These past and current efforts,
however, are insufficient to reach the goal of convicting more perpetrators.
Modifications to the UCMJ and the Military Rules of Evidence could assist
prosecutors in achieving this goal and better protect victims. A proposed bill,
attached as an appendix to this article, includes recommended provisions that could
do just that. As the proposed legislation indicates statutory revisions would do the
following: 1) return the offense of “Indecent Act,” to Article 120 criminal
offenses; 2) modify the definition of force to be more inclusive by adding
“suggesting possession of a dangerous weapon”; 3) eliminate the increased
emphasis on whether the victim’s fears are “reasonable”; 4) eliminate the focus on
the accused’s perception of the victim’s behavior; 5) return the statutory
limitations regarding the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent; 6)
adopt California’s evidentiary threshold for giving affirmative defense instructions
on mistake of fact as to consent and consent; 7) establish a statutory structure
restricting judicial appellate discretion in determining lesser-included offense
instructions; and 8) limit good military character evidence in courts-martial for
crimes of violence and sexual misconduct. The proposals set forth by this article
for changing military substantive criminal law (Article 120, UCMJ) and the
Military Rules of Evidence would result not only in a system more consistent with
federal and state laws, but also modify the military justice system and in all
likelihood lead to more convictions for sexual assault offenses in the military
services.
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APPENDIX
………………………………………………….
(Original Signature of Member)

113TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. ______

To amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide more consistency with
federal and state sexual assault statutes and create a more comprehensive sexual
assault statute for the military Services by: including the offense of “Indecent Act,”
in Article 120 criminal offenses; defining force to include “suggesting possession
of a dangerous weapon”; eliminating the increased emphasis on whether the
victim’s fears are “reasonable”; removing the focus from the accused’s perceptions
of the victim; limiting the scope of the mistake of fact as to consent defense to
ensure perpetrators cannot be acquitted by only asserting their perceptions that the
victims were consenting; adopting California’s evidentiary threshold for giving
affirmative defense instructions on mistake of fact as to consent and consent;
establishing a statutory structure restricting judicial appellate discretion in
determining lesser-included offense instructions; and, limiting good military
character evidence in courts-martial for crimes of violence and sexual misconduct.
_______________________

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
____________________ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the
Committee on ________________________

_______________________________

A BILL
To amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to provide more
consistency with federal and state sexual assault statutes and create a more
comprehensive sexual assault statute for the military Services.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Military Sexual Assault Reform Act of 2013’’.
SEC. 2. REINSTATING THE OFFENSE OF INDECENT ACT AS AN OFFENSE
(a) THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS ARE REINSTATED TO SECTION 920 OF TITLE 10
U.S. CODE:
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(a) Indecent act. Any person subject to this chapter who engages in indecent
conduct is guilty of an indecent act and shall be punished as a court-martial may
direct.
(b) Indecent conduct. The term “indecent conduct” means that form of
immorality relating to sexual impurity that is grossly vulgar, obscene, and
repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave
morals with respect to sexual relations.
SEC. 3. IMPROVEMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF FORCE
(a) SECTION 920(G) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS:
(a) Section 920(g)(5)(A) is repealed and replaced with “(g)(5)(A) the use,
display, or the suggestion of use, of a weapon.”
(b) In Section 920(g)(7), the words “a reasonable” are repealed and replaced
with “victim to” from the phrase “a communication or action that is of sufficient
consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the
victim or another person being subjected to the wrongful action contemplated by
the communication or action.”
(c) Section 920(b)(2) is repealed and replaced with “(2) engages in a sexual
act with another person of any age if that other person is substantially incapacitated
or substantially incapable of—(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act; (B)
declining participating in the sexual act; or (C) communicating unwillingness to
engage in the sexual act; is guilty of aggravated sexual assault.”
SEC. 4. DECREASING THE EMPHASIS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT PROSECUTIONS
ON THE PERPETRATOR’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE VICTIM’S CONSENT.
(a) SECTION 920(F)(1) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE IS ADDED TO THE DEFENSE
SUBSECTION OF SECTION 920 AS FOLLOWS:
“(1) Affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent. The term
“affirmative defense” means any special defense that, although not denying that
the accused committed the objective acts constituting the offense charged, denies,
wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility for those acts. The military judge shall
not instruct the members that there is a defense of mistake of fact as to consent: (1)
if the defense evidence is unequivocal consent and the prosecution’s evidence is of
non-consensual forcible sex; or (2) unless substantial evidence has been presented
on the merits that the mistake of fact affirmative defense, as defined in section
Article 120(g)(9), 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(9) applies.”
(b) SECTION 920(G)(9) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE IS ADDED TO THE DEFINITION
SUBSECTION OF SECTION 920 AS FOLLOWS:
“(9) Mistake of fact as to consent. The term “mistake of fact as to consent”
means the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect belief that
the other person engaging in the sexual conduct consented. The ignorance or
mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused and must have been
reasonable under all the circumstances. To be reasonable, the ignorance or mistake
must have been based on information, or lack of it, that would indicate to a
reasonable person that the other person consented. Additionally, the ignorance or
mistake cannot be based on the negligent failure to discover the true facts.
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Negligence is the absence of due care. Due care is what a reasonably careful
person would do under the same or similar circumstances. The accused’s state of
intoxication, if any, at the time of the offense is not relevant to mistake of fact. A
mistaken belief that the other person consented must be that which a reasonably
careful, ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have had under the circumstances at
the time of the offense. A reasonable mistake of fact may not be found that is
based upon ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of conduct
by the accused that amounts to force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of the alleged victim or
another.”
SEC. 5. CONFORMING COURTS-MARTIAL WITH U.S. DISTRICT COURT
PROCEDURES
(a) APPLY THE SAME TEST THAT IS USED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR
INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES IN COURTS-MARTIAL BY
ADDING SECTION 850(C)(5) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE—Section 850(c)(5), is added
stating:
“(c) An instruction on a lesser-included offense may not be made to the
members by the military judge unless (1) a proper request is made; (2) the lesseroffense elements are identical to part of the greater-offense elements; (3) some
evidence would justify conviction of the lesser offense; (4) there is evidence such
that the jury may find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesserincluded offense; and (5) mutuality.”
SEC. 6. INADMISSIBILITY OF GOOD MILITARY CHARACTER EVIDENCE
(a) ADMISSIBILITY OF GOOD MILITARY CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CASES
INVOLVING VIOLENCE OR SEXUAL ASSAULT. Section 850b is added to Title 10
U.S. Code as follows:
“§ 850b. art. 50b. Admissibility of character evidence
In any case, not capital, involving a violation of Articles 118 to 132;
Articles 77 to 82 involving predicate offenses under Articles 118 to 132; and
Articles 133 and 134 offenses involving violence or sexual activity, evidence of
military character is not admissible to show probability of innocence. Affidavits or
other written statements of persons other than the accused, concerning the
character of the accused or of any other witness, and evidence of law-abiding
character shall be admissible to the same extent as under Federal Rule of Evidence
405 in criminal cases tried in U.S. District Court.
General military character includes but is not limited to past or future
combat performance, dependability, leadership, initiative, duty performance,
proficiency, military bearing, and promptness. Evidence of law-abiding character
shall be admissible to the same extent as under Federal Rule of Evidence 404 in
criminal cases tried in U.S. District Court.”

